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Scholars are eager to evaluate the effects of health policy on health, but they often neglect that policies are
intricately connected to marriage, family structure, and social standing. The three chapters of this dissertation
study unintended consequences of health insurance policies in the United States. How people gain private
health insurance is connected to divorce (chapter 1) and availability of a public insurance program at birth is
associated with lower mortality not only in infanthood but also in adulthood (chapter 2). US health policies
that tie health insurance coverage to socioeconomic status add dimensions to racial and ethnic inequality.
Minorities spend more years without insurance due to their greater probabilities of losing coverage (chapter
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In Chapter 1, I apply hazard models to the nationally representative longitudinal Survey of Income and
Program Participation (2004 panel) to find lower divorce rates among people who are enrolled in their
spouses’ health insurance policies. Women who depend on their husbands for health insurance had the lowest
rates of divorce. This chapter highlights how family- and employment-based insurance coverage could create
inequalities between families and between men and women.
In Chapter 2, I use US Vital Statistics data to compare changes in age-specific mortality rates between cohorts
born in states with Medicaid and cohorts born in states without Medicaid. I exploit the variation in the timing
of States’ Medicaid participation to establish a connection between the availability of public insurance at birth
to improvements in later life mortality. This chapter underscores the lasting consequences of having access to
medical care during critical periods in the life-course.
Chapter 3 examines the dynamics of gaining and losing health insurance across the life course and how it
contributes to racial and ethnic disparities in coverage. African Americans, Hispanics, and Asians have high
uninsurance rates mostly due to their greater likelihoods of losing the insurance that they already have. Life-
table simulations show that simply increasing the accessibility of health insurance does surprisingly little to
reduce disparities in insurance coverage. This paper draws attention to the importance of developing policies
that stabilize existing insurance.
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ABSTRACT 
SOCIAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC CONSEQUENCES OF HEALTH INSURANCE 
Heeju Sohn 
Jason Schnittker 
 
Scholars are eager to evaluate the effects of health policy on health, but they often neglect 
that policies are intricately connected to marriage, family structure, and social standing. 
The three chapters of this dissertation study unintended consequences of health insurance 
policies in the United States. How people gain private health insurance is connected to 
divorce (chapter 1) and availability of a public insurance program at birth is associated 
with lower mortality not only in infanthood but also in adulthood (chapter 2). US health 
policies that tie health insurance coverage to socioeconomic status add dimensions to 
racial and ethnic inequality. Minorities spend more years without insurance due to their 
greater probabilities of losing coverage (chapter 3). These chapters provide national 
landscapes of health insurance coverage and inequality in the years prior to the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 setting the baseline for post-reform 
comparisons.  
In Chapter 1, I apply hazard models to the nationally representative longitudinal 
Survey of Income and Program Participation (2004 panel) to find lower divorce rates 
among people who are enrolled in their spouses’ health insurance policies. Women who 
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depend on their husbands for health insurance had the lowest rates of divorce. This 
chapter highlights how family- and employment-based insurance coverage could create 
inequalities between families and between men and women.  
In Chapter 2, I use US Vital Statistics data to compare changes in age-specific 
mortality rates between cohorts born in states with Medicaid and cohorts born in states 
without Medicaid. I exploit the variation in the timing of States’ Medicaid participation to 
establish a connection between the availability of public insurance at birth to 
improvements in later life mortality. This chapter underscores the lasting consequences of 
having access to medical care during critical periods in the life-course.  
Chapter 3 examines the dynamics of gaining and losing health insurance across 
the life course and how it contributes to racial and ethnic disparities in coverage. African 
Americans, Hispanics, and Asians have high uninsurance rates mostly due to their greater 
likelihoods of losing the insurance that they already have. Life-table simulations show 
that simply increasing the accessibility of health insurance does surprisingly little to 
reduce disparities in insurance coverage. This paper draws attention to the importance of 
developing policies that stabilize existing insurance. 
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Introduction: Socioeconomic Class and Health in the Context of Public 
Policy in the United States 
 
A well-developed literature in the social sciences shows how families share social, 
economic, and human capital and how it translates into an intergenerational transmission 
of social class. Health and mortality are established as both causes and consequences of 
socioeconomic class. The chapters of this dissertation aim to contribute to the literature 
that connects health and socioeconomic status across family ties.  
This dissertation examines family processes and social inequality and their 
interactions with health policy in the United States. People get married, bear children, and 
make daily medical decisions in the context of the policy environment. Here, I 
demonstrate how public policy plays a significant role in creating and shaping the 
boundaries between social classes.  
Health insurance coverage allows access to better medical care and mitigates the 
adverse consequences of poor health for individuals and families.  It is considered an 
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important, if not crucial, form of social insurance (Marmor et al. 2013). In the United 
States, health insurance coverage is very closely tied to a person’s socioeconomic status. 
Families with high-paying, stable earnings are more likely to enjoy consistent, higher 
quality health insurance. Those that lack the means to afford private coverage turn to 
arguably lower-quality public options such as Medicaid (Quesnel-Vallee 2004) or forgo 
insurance altogether.  
Health insurance coverage is more than a mere reward of employment and wealth. 
It can in turn, affect the socioeconomic status of individuals and his or her family. Going 
without insurance limits access to medical care, health, and the financial well-being of 
the entire household (Himmelstein  et al. 2009; Kasper et al. 2000; Nelson et al. 1999; 
Zuvekas and Weinick 1999).  
The current literature on the consequences of unequal health insurance coverage 
predominantly focuses on short-term health outcomes and its resulting disparities. The 
chapters of this dissertation contribute to current scholarship by drawing attention to 
previously understudied demographic processes that may be influenced by health 
insurance policies (divorce and long-term mortality) and by making improvements to 
how researchers can measure and compare insurance coverage.  
This dissertation bridges three major scholarly themes: transmission of 
socioeconomic status, health, and public policy. Before summarizing each chapter, I 
briefly review the major theories that guide the empirical analyses of this dissertation.  
Bourdieu’s work on intergenerational transfer of social capital provided the 
theoretical framework for much scholarship on the transmission of socioeconomic status 
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within families. Parents would endow children with social capital that they would then 
use to establish their own class on reaching adulthood. Families with greater 
socioeconomic status had more capital to bestow on their offspring. And through this 
process, social class was maintained across generations. The current literature uncovers 
mechanisms beyond direct economic transfers that reinforce class boundaries. Higher-
income parents cultivated their children to develop a social habitus that gave them an 
advantage for academic and financial success in adulthood (Laureau 2003). These parents 
are likely to better prepare their children for college with greater material resources for 
education (Conley 2001; Schoeni et al. 2005) and social connections and information to 
place them in high status occupations (Lubrano 2005). Children of different social classes 
have disparate transitions into adulthood (Furstenberg 2010) completing the replication of 
social class. Diverging demographic trends between social classes (McLanahan 2004) 
reinforce these intergenerational disparities. Individuals with less education and lower 
income are more likely to raise children in single-parent families (Edin and Kefalas 2005; 
Martin 2006) arguably reducing the social capital that these children receive even more 
(Amato and Gilbreth 1999; Amato and Rivera 1999).  
Health and socioeconomic class are intertwined throughout the life-course and 
across generations. Social and environmental mechanisms for intergenerational 
transmission of health are also well-studied in social demography. The Barker and fetal 
origins hypotheses motivated many studied that linked prenatal and early health 
conditions to later adult outcomes. Being born into a high mortality environment was 
associated with increased risk of ischemic heart disease in adulthood (Barker and 
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Osmond 1986).  Being born during a recession was also linked to lasting heighted 
mortality (Van den Berg et al. 2006). Quasi-experimental studies find that cohorts in 
utero during the 1918 Influenza Pandemic displayed increased incidence of physical 
disability, lower educational achievement, and lower income in adulthood (Almond 
2006). Similarly, children of mothers who were pregnant during the 1944 Dutch Famine 
showed worse health outcomes throughout adulthood (Roseboom et al., 2001). More 
direct explorations of the relationship between socioeconomic class and health 
consistently find that health, education, and income are correlated with each other. 
Children from low SES households were more likely to have health problems. The 
correlation between parents’ income and child health becomes stronger as the child grows 
older even after they leave the household (Case et al. 2005). In adulthood, poor health led 
to diminished earnings and reductions in wealth (Cutler et al. 2008; Smith 2007). These 
empirical studies work to establish long-term, intergenerational connections between 
health and social class.  
This dissertation explores the relationship between health and social inequality in 
the context of health systems and public policy. The three chapters examine unintended 
consequences of health insurance policy in the United States. Scholars and policymakers 
are eager to evaluate the effects of health policy on health, but they often neglect that 
policies are intricately connected to family processes and have lasting effects on health 
and social class. I employ demographic tools to quantify the unintended consequences of 
health insurance on family processes and demographic trends. Bane and Ellewood (1986) 
changed how to think about poverty by examining spells of poverty. Through 
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demographic methods, I reveal new insight into the interplay of health policy and social 
processes that static, cross-sectional pictures may obscure.  
The first chapter finds evidence that people who are enrolled in their spouses’ 
health insurance policies have lower risks of divorce. I also find that this association is 
stronger among women than men. I apply hazard models to a nationally representative 
longitudinal data (the Survey of Income Program Participation) to compare divorce risks 
between insurance-dependent, that is, adults who are insured through their spouses, and 
insurance-independent adults, that is, adults who have health insurance policies available 
to them through their employment. The findings draw attention to the influence that a 
marriage and employment-based health insurance system can have on divorce rates. 
Establishing connections between health policy and family formation/dissolution are 
especially important as the United States undergoes one of the largest health care reforms 
of the past century.  
The second chapter explores the enduring effects of Medicaid. Medicaid is a 
means-tested federal program delivering public health insurance program to mostly low-
income women and infants. In this study, I show that the start of Medicaid was not only 
associated with reducing infant mortality rates across states but was also associated with 
health outcomes even after aging out of eligibility. For the research design, I exploit 
variation in the timing of States’ Medicaid participation to establish a connection between 
the initiation of Medicaid availability at birth to later-life mortality. This chapter 
underscores the lasting consequences of having access to medical care during critical 
periods in the life-course.  
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The third chapter examines the dynamics of gaining and losing health insurance 
across the life course and how it contributes to racial and ethnic disparities in coverage. 
African Americans, Hispanics, and Asians have high uninsurance rates mostly due to 
their greater likelihood of losing the insurance that they already have especially during 
early adulthood and middle age. Furthermore, life-table simulations show that simply 
increasing the accessibility of health insurance does surprisingly little to reduce 
uninsurance prevalence among minorities. This paper draws attention to the importance 
of developing policies that stabilize existing insurance. This chapter motivates further 
research on whether precarious insurance coverage among minority groups can explain 
disparities in interactions with health care providers, medical decisions, and health 
outcomes.  
These are interesting topics to study in the wake of the Affordable Care Act 
(ACA). The chapters set baselines for pre- and post- ACA comparisons once the rollout 
is complete. State-level variation in ACA adoption provides an interesting setting for a 
natural experiment to observe changes in family processes and social inequality that 
coincide with the ACA. Medicaid expansions in select states will allow all low-income 
persons regardless of marital and parental status to become eligible. Individual mandates 
will further incentivize people to become insured and to stay insured. State-sponsored 
insurance exchanges will diminish the strong connection between employment, marriage, 
and access to health insurance in participating states.  
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Chapter 1: Health Insurance and Risk of Divorce: Does Having Your Own 
Insurance Matter? 
 
ABSTRACT 
Most American adults under 65 obtain health insurance through their employers or their 
spouses’ employers.  The absence of a universal healthcare system in the United States 
puts Americans at considerable risk for losing their coverage when transitioning out of 
jobs or marriages.  Scholars have found evidence of reduced job mobility among 
individuals who are dependent on their employers for healthcare coverage. This paper 
finds similar relationships between insurance and divorce. I apply the hazard model to 
married individuals in the longitudinal Survey of Income Program Participation 
(N=17,388) and find lower divorce rates among people who are insured through their 
partners’ plans without alternative sources of their own. Furthermore, I find gender 
differences in the relationship between healthcare coverage and divorce rates: insurance 
dependent women have lower rates of divorce than men in similar situations. These 
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findings draw attention to the importance of considering family processes when debating 
and evaluating health policies.  
Love and commitment are often what couples believe secure and protect marriages from 
divorce. Sociologists of the family however, find that practical considerations are 
probably more important (Kalmijn, 1998). Married couples with high incomes are more 
likely to stay married (Amato, 2010; Gibson-Davis, Edin, & McLanahan, 2005). 
Educational attainment—an indicator of earnings potential—is also associated with 
greater marital stability (Amato, 2010). Education and income are consistently stronger 
predictors of divorce than sentiment-driven indicators. Recognizing the significance of 
these factors, researchers are careful to take household income, the couple’s educational 
attainment, wealth, and other resources into consideration as they study divorce patterns. 
Researchers have yet to study insurance coverage as a factor that can influence divorce. 
This paper examines the relationship between health insurance and divorce by asking 
three main research questions. (1) Is there an association between being insured by a 
spouse and divorce? (2) Does this association get stronger when one partner does not 
have an independent source of health insurance? (3) Do these associations differ by 
gender?  
The United States is among the few and perhaps the only developed country that 
does not provide universal healthcare to its residents (Jost, 2003). While seniors over 64 
years of age are assured coverage under Medicare, the majority of non-elderly adult men 
and women are left responsible for securing their own health insurance. Employment and 
marriage are the top two sources of health insurance for American adults; 24% of non-
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elderly adult women and 14% of men are covered as a dependent (Kaiser Family 
Foundation, 2011). In comparison, 55.3% of the adult population gains health insurance 
though employment (US Census, 2012).  
Insurance is consequential. Being uninsured is associated with lower healthcare 
utilization, increased morbidity, and higher mortality (Institute of Medicine, 2004). Not 
having insurance creates barriers to adequate access to healthcare (Institute of Medicine, 
2002). Uninsured individuals are more likely to be diagnosed with late-stage cancer—a 
disease that is often detected at early states during routine doctor visits (Halpern, War, 
Pavluck, Schrag, Bian, & Chen, 2008)—and are less likely to have an ongoing 
relationship with a health care provider (Holahan & Spillman, 2002). In addition, medical 
expenses contribute to a large portion of personal bankruptcies in the United States 
(Himmelstein, Thorne, Warren, & Woolhandler, 2009). Considering these known risks of 
being uninsured, it is not surprising that Americans treat health insurance as a valuable 
commodity.  
Even brief periods of uninsurance can be costly. As American adults transition 
into and out of jobs and marriages, they risk losing health insurance coverage (Lavelle & 
Smock, 2012; Meyer & Pavalko, 1996). No social infrastructure guarantees continued 
health insurance through these transitions. The Consolidated Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act (COBRA) allows people to purchase insurance at the lower group rate 
under certain conditions, but is only available for limited periods and its costs can be 
prohibitive, especially for recently unemployed or divorced individuals. Many cannot 
help but experience a gap in insurance coverage as they change jobs or go through 
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divorce (Lavelle & Smock, 2012; Swartz & McBride, 1990). These gaps are significant. 
They can increase premiums or limit payouts even when individuals gain coverage, 
particularly for those who have on-going health care needs (van de Ven, van Vliet, Schut, 
& van Barneveld, 2000).  Gaps can also have significant financial consequences for those 
who fall ill while uninsured.  
Researchers who study employment and wages have established that the health 
insurance benefits are an important part of an employee’s compensation; a job that 
provides health insurance yields substantially higher total compensation than a job with 
the same salary but no health benefits (Woodbury, 1983). Studies also show that 
insurance can act as a significant motivator for people to seek and retain employment, at 
times even deterring workers from pursuing otherwise better opportunities (Cooper & 
Monheit, 1993; Madrian, 1994; Monheit & Cooper, 1994).  If health insurance plays such 
a large role in the labor market, we can expect it to also play a role in the marriage 
market. After all, approximately 36 million American adults under the age of 65 rely on a 
family member to provide their health insurance (KFF, 2011). This paper finds that 
married individuals who are dependent on their spouses for health insurance have lower 
rates of divorce. Having private health insurance is highly correlated with socio-
economic characteristics such as high education, stable employment, and high income.  
These factors all lower the risk of divorce, but the analyses show health insurance does 
not follow the same pattern. This paper shows that divorce risk is lowest among people 
who do not have the option of employment-based coverage and are insured under their 
spouses’ plans.  I use the longitudinal 2004 Panel of Survey of Income Program 
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Participation (SIPP). The 2004 SIPP tracks a nationally representative sample of over 
43,500 households over time with great granularity recording each member’s marital and 
healthcare status every month from October 2003 through December 2007. I employ the 
Cox proportional hazard model to estimate the relative risk of divorce between insurance-
dependent and non-dependent individuals.  
BACKGROUND 
In his economic models of marriage, Gary Becker (1974) posits that positive gains to 
marriage and negative consequences of divorce motivate two individuals to stay married. 
His theory argues that couples with greater economic resources have lower risks of 
marital dissolution as these resources will increase the gains that individuals would derive 
from their unions. Higher levels of income can protect married couples from financial 
stressors (Sawhill, 1975). Economic assets, such as homeownership, can also have 
stabilizing effects on marriage (Becker, Landes, & Michael, 1977; Levinger, 1979; South 
& Spitze, 1986).  By the same token, couples with higher levels of educational attainment 
are less likely to divorce (Martin, 2006).  
The decision to divorce is not always unilateral. Becker and his coauthors (1977) 
explain that couples will remain married if the combined gains of staying married exceed 
the combined benefits of separating. If person A wants to divorce while their partner B 
does not, the latter can ‘compensate’ the former to make it worthwhile for both parties. If 
the combined net benefit of the union is not enough to satisfy both partners, however, the 
marriage will result in dissolution.  
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This study examines health insurance as a potential gain to a marriage. Because 
health insurance pertains to the household, it is perhaps a prominent feature of the 
combined gains of marriage. A family health insurance plan that covers both spouses can 
be considered a shared good that benefits from economies of scale. It is less costly than 
two people being insured independently. A person who is not covered by their spouse 
must either purchase an individual plan at a higher price or gain access to a group plan, 
usually through employment. In this way, securing private health insurance for a married 
couple is cheaper than two individuals obtaining their own and, therefore, it can be 
considered an economic ‘gain’ of marriage.  
 While health insurance has not been explicitly studied as an economic gain of 
marriage, it has been examined in the context of employment and job mobility (Cooper & 
Monheit, 1993; Madrian, 1994; Monheit & Cooper, 1994). Studies find that jobs that 
offer health insurance plans have lower turnover rates (Cooper & Monheit, 1993; 
Madrian, 1994; Monheit & Cooper, 1994). Likewise, being married to someone who can 
provide a health insurance policy may increase the gains of the marriage, leading to lower 
rates of divorce. My first hypothesis is:  
Hypothesis 1: Married individuals who are insured through their spouses’ health plans 
have lower rates of divorce 
The second hypothesis examines the risk of losing health insurance coverage as a 
potential negative consequence of divorce. Does the association between insurance 
coverage and divorce get stronger when one partner does not have an independent source 
of health insurance? Researchers of employer-specific insurance plans and job-mobility 
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find that people who are expected to be worse off if they lose current coverage—for 
example, employees with greater medical expenditures and those without spouses who 
can provide coverage during transitions—have lower rates of job-mobility (Buchmueller 
& Valletta, 1996; Cooper & Monheit, 1993; Gruber & Madrian, 2002; Madrian, 1994). 
The economic consequence of divorce can also be influenced by whether those in a 
marriage have access to group coverage independently. The cost of divorce for people 
who can switch over to their employers’ plans on divorce will not be as high as those 
whose only sources of insurance coverage is from their spouses.  Not having a 
comparable source of health insurance outside the marriage increases the negative 
consequences of divorce that may lead to lower divorce rates. I use employer-sponsored 
health insurance as a comparable alternative to spouse-provided health insurance plans. 
There are alternatives, but they are not as relevant. Public means-tested cash transfers, for 
example, do not appear to lower the cost of divorce. (Hoffman & Duncan, 1995). 
Likewise, needs-based public health insurance, such as Medicaid, would not be a 
comparable substitute to a private, family insurance plan. Needs-based public insurance 
is often available only at very low levels of income and is sometimes considered to be of 
lower quality than private insurance plans (Quesnel-Vallee, 2004).  
Hypothesis 2: Not having an employment-based source of health insurance coverage 
outside the marriage further lowers the risk of divorce for people enrolled in their 
spouses’ plans.  
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Gender, Health Insurance, and Marriage 
The story of divorce and health insurance is further complicated by the issue of gender. 
Historically, the division of labor in a US household has fallen along gendered lines 
(Cherlin, 1995; Greenstein, 1995; Kalmijn, Loeve, & Manting, 2007; Nock, 1995; 
Presser, 2000; Sayer, England, Allison, & Kangas, 2011). While spousal roles and duties 
have become more flexible and negotiable over time, the traditional male breadwinner 
model of the family persists (Greenstein, 1995). Women still do most housework and 
childrearing (Cherlin, 1995; Nock, 1995) and marriages are more stable when the 
husband earns more than his wife (Kalmijn et al., 2007). The responsibility of financial 
contribution still primarily falls onto the man. A husband’s unemployment is strongly 
related to divorce whereas a wife’s is not (Sayer et al., 2011). By the same token, 
Teachman (2010) found that health-related work limitations among men but not among 
women were associated with higher rates of marital disruption. The gains of a marriage 
increase when the gendered expectations of their husbands resuming the role of the 
primary breadwinner are met.  For wives, spouses’ incomes have a positive relationship 
with their self-reported levels of marital commitment (Nock, 1995).  
The same relationship applies to health insurance as well. If traditional gender 
roles put pressure on husbands to contribute financially via economic activity in the labor 
market, it is also likely that men are expected to provide the family with health insurance. 
Thus, I expect to see gender differences in the divorce rates associated with insurance 
dependence in my analysis. My third hypothesis is:  
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Hypothesis 3: Women who are insured through their spouses have lower rates of divorce 
than men who are insured through their spouses 
The fourth hypothesis examines whether the association between divorce and 
having an alternative source of insurance is stronger for women than it is for men. With 
men taking on the primary responsibility of the household income, it is not surprising the 
economic consequences of divorce are less favorable for women than men (Burkhauser, 
Duncan, Hauser, & Berntsen, 1991). Burkhauser and Duncan (1989) found that divorce 
or separation was the single most financially detrimental event that could happen to non-
elderly women.  Divorce’s consequences for health insurance are equally striking 
(Bernstein, Cohen, Brett, & Bush, 2008; Lavelle & Smock, 2012). Lavelle and Smock 
(2012) find that, divorce leads to an eight percentage-point decline in women’s private 
health insurance coverage, net of changes in employment, economic resources, and other 
factors. This decline was even sharper for women insured as a dependent. A corollary of 
these findings is that wives’ economic independence through labor force participation 
may lower barriers against divorce (Duncan & Hoffman, 1985; Lavelle & Smock, 2012). 
Duncan and Hoffman (1985) found that women’s human capital investments have some 
modest effects on mitigating the decline in their economic situation following a divorce. 
Similarly, Lavelle and Smock (2012) also found that just-divorced women who were 
insured through their own plans were largely protected from the risk of losing private 
coverage.   
Hypothesis 4: Not having an alternative source of health insurance outside the marriage 
lowers divorce risk for women more so than for men 
   
 
19 
 
METHOD 
Data 
I use the 2004 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) to 
examine the relationship between health insurance status and divorce. The SIPP is a 
nationally representative series of longitudinal panels whose survey duration ranges from 
2.5 to 4 years. The first SIPP panel was sampled in the early 1980s and a new panel was 
re-sampled from the non-institutionalized population in the U.S. every one to four years. 
The 2004 SIPP panel is a longitudinal dataset that follows its respondents for about four 
years from October 2003 until December 2007. The strength of this dataset lies in its 
large size, its wide range of household insurance and demographic variables, and its 
longitudinal structure. The SIPP survey is divided into core questionnaires and topical 
modules. The core questionnaire collects data for the same variables every month 
throughout the study period. The SIPP administers a topical module containing a 
different theme (i.e. marital history) once every four months. The SIPP then creates 
longitudinal panels checking for data inconsistencies and missing values. The Census 
Bureau accounts for missing values by logically deriving from other available 
information when possible. They rely on several imputation techniques to fill in the 
remaining missing data. Thus, if a respondent completed a questionnaire or a module, all 
variables had valid values. Most of the variables that I use in my analyses are from the 
core questionnaires. Since these variables are recorded every month, I can get relatively 
close estimates of when changes occurred. Life events such as divorce and changes to 
insurance rarely happen multiple times within a single month.    
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The 2004 SIPP collected data for 45,540 individuals. The hypotheses in this paper 
pertain to the risk of divorce. Therefore, I only include married individuals in the analytic 
sample. I dropped 14,239 individuals (33% of total initial 2004 SIPP dataset) who were 
not married during the study period. Furthermore, I only include married individuals 
whose marriage duration is known. The sample includes people who were already 
married when the SIPP started to collect data in October 2003 and people who became 
married during the study period before it ended in December 2007. For those who were 
already married in October 2003, I derive their marriage durations from their marital 
history topical module that the SIPP administered in May 2004. I exclude 1,354 (3% of 
initial 2004 SIPP dataset) married respondents who did not complete the marital history 
topical module from the sample.  Lastly, I limit my analysis to non-elderly adults. Those 
over 65 are almost universally insured through Medicare and divorce may affect their 
insurance status differently than the rest of the adult population. I exclude 10,559 persons 
(24% of initial data) over the age of 64 or under the age of 18 from the sample.  
My analysis sample consists of 17,388 individuals who were married at some 
point during the study period between October 2003 and December 2007.  They 
collectively experienced over 500 divorces. I weight the observations using sampling 
weights to compensate for SIPP’s different selection probabilities into the 2004 panel 
across subpopulations.  
Variables 
Marital Status. The 17,388 individuals in my sample, weighted to represent 
approximately 46 million US residents, were married at some point during the study 
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period. A change in a respondent’s marital status reflects a marriage or divorce/separation 
sometime during the previous 30 days. Only the respondents who are married are at risk 
of divorce or separation and I limit hazard calculations to the currently married at any 
point in time. The incremental hazards of separation in response to all covariates are 
similar to the hazards of divorce. Sensitivity tests result in similar hazard patterns for all 
three events: divorce only, separation only, and divorce or separation. The analyses in 
this paper examine the hazard of either divorce or separation.  
Health Insurance Status. I combine two SIPP variables asking health insurance 
type and coverage source to create a nominal scale to differentiate individuals who are 
covered by their own plan from those covered under someone else's, government 
sponsored need based insurance (Medicare or Medicaid), or none at all. The SIPP 
specifically asks if the primary subscriber is the respondent’s spouse at only one point in 
time during the survey period. More than 95% of married people on June 2005 who are 
insured on someone else’s plan are insured on their spouses’ plan. I assume that this 
extremely high rate of spousal coverage among married individuals who are not primary 
subscribers is approximately constant throughout the study period. I lag insurance status 
by one month to associate the insurance status prior to the divorce, as this marital event is 
often accompanied by a simultaneous change in health care status. I have conducted 
sensitivity test using a two, three, and six month lag time between insurance status and 
marital disruption. There is little difference in the coefficients and the hypotheses tests up 
to a lag time of three months. At six months, the coefficients in the hazard models 
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become smaller in size, but even with a lag time that is one-eighth of the total survey 
period the tests of hypotheses yield the same results.  
Alternative Source of Health Insurance.   In my analysis, I consider individuals 
who are unemployed, contingent workers, or employed part-time at small companies with 
less than 100 employees to be without access to employer-sponsored health insurance 
plans outside the marriage. Full-time employment status and the size of the firm are two 
indicators that predict whether an employer offers health insurance to an employee 
(Kaiser Family Foundation, 2013). Throughout the study period, 97 to 99 percent of firms 
with over 200 workers offered health insurance to their employees, whereas only 59 to 65 
percent of smaller firms offered insurance plans (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2013). Very 
few firms offered insurance plans to temporary workers (three to six percent). Less than a 
quarter of small firms offered plans to their part-time staff but almost half (47%) of large 
firms offered insurance to workers who were not full time employees (Kaiser Family 
Foundation, 2013). Lavelle and Smock (2012)’s study also find that full time workers 
were largely protected from insurance loss after divorce.  
I confirm from the 2004 SIPP that its respondents’ employment statuses and their 
employers’ firm sizes are indeed good predictors of whether the respondents have access 
to health benefits. I test how closely these variables capture respondents’ access to 
employment-based health insurance by examining single, never-married individuals. 
Almost 80% of single, never-married respondents who I assigned as having “access to 
employer-sponsored health insurance” are insured as the primary subscriber. About half 
of the never-married people who I categorized as having access but are in fact uninsured, 
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voluntarily elected not to enroll in their employers’ plans. The SIPP asked specific 
questions on whether a respondent’s employer offers insurance plans and his or her 
reasons for not enrolling only once in June 2005. Therefore, I could not use this variable 
to create a better measurement of the availability of employment-based insurance 
throughout the entire period.  
Control Variables. I incorporate demographic and socioeconomic variables that 
prior research identified as determinants or predictors of divorce—education, race and 
ethnic origin, number of children, age, marital history, and household income (Amato, 
2010; Casper & Bianchi, 2001; Cherlin, 1992). My models include gender, race/ethnicity, 
educational attainment, the number of children, and a polynomial term for age as 
controlling covariates. Many households in the SIPP report income that fluctuates 
significantly from month to month. Some households report their entire annual income in 
one month leaving the monthly income for the rest of the year at zero. To smooth the 
income flow, I use the average of monthly total family income to measure the family’s 
level of financial standing. I expect higher educational attainment, higher income, and 
having more children to be associated with lower rates of divorce (Amato, 2010). Marital 
history is another predictor of divorce or separation (Becker et al., 1977; Lehrer, 1988; 
Presser, 2010). I include an indicator for whether or not the current marriage is a first 
marriage. Higher order marriages may be more likely to end in divorce or separation 
(Becker et al., 1977; Lehrer, 1988). I also include a polynomial term for the length of 
marriage. Probability of dissolution decreases with the duration of marriage (Becker et 
al.,1977; Presser, 2000). Couples who would end up divorced tend to end their marriage 
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earlier than later (Becker et al., 1977) and people make more marriage-specific 
investments (e.g. children, sexual compatibility) the longer they are together (Lehrer, 
1988). All covariates with the exception of gender and race are time-varying.  
Analytic Strategy 
I use Cox's proportional hazard model (Cox, 1972) to measure the effect of health 
insurance on marriage. This model estimates the incremental risk of an event happening 
to one group relative to a reference group. A person’s hazard is a multiplicative replica of 
the baseline hazard based on his or her set of covariates. In this way, the model can 
identify characteristics that are associated with greater or lower hazards of events such as 
divorce (Bumpass, 1990). I use STATA13’s stcox package to estimate all hazard 
coefficients. I test the model’s assumption that divorce hazards of the comparison groups 
are proportional over time. I interact the key variables of the analysis (insurance status 
and access to employer-sponsored health plans) with time (reference month) and test for 
statistically significant time-varying effects. A joint test of significance revealed no 
systematic change in the association between insurance status and access to employer-
sponsored health plans.  
I estimate four hazard models to test each of the four hypotheses in this paper. 
The first model estimates the divorce hazards associated with insurance status. Model 2 
adds access to employment-based insurance to model 1 and interacts it with the 
respondent’s insurance status. Model 3 interacts gender with insurance status to examine 
any gender differences in the association between insurance and divorce. The fourth 
model is a three-way interaction between insurance status, access to an employment-
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based option, and gender. I present the hazards associated with the interactions in Models 
2-4 with a series of dummy variables. I report these hazards in odds ratios. Each odds 
ratio indicates the relative hazard of divorce or separation of a respondent with a 
particular characteristic relative to the reference group. All models include covariates for 
age, race, education, children, higher-order marriage, marriage duration, and logged 
average monthly income as controls. I then select the relevant coefficients from the 
hazard models to explicitly test the four hypotheses of this paper. I calculate p-values 
from one-sided t-tests adjusted for false discovery rate (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995). 
These p-values are more conservative than unadjusted p-values as they take into account 
that the probability of falsely rejecting a null condition increases with the number of tests 
performed. I present the four Cox hazard models and their hypothesis tests in the main 
results section of this paper.  
RESULTS 
Descriptive Results 
I estimate divorce hazards from the 17,388 individuals in the 2004 SIPP who were 
married at some point between October 2003 and December 2007. Table 1.1 shows the 
basic descriptive statistics of my analysis sample. The percentages and averages 
presented in Table 1.1 are weighted to represent the adult US married population under 
age 65. About half the sample was insured under their own names and a third were 
insured as dependents. Less than 20% of the analysis sample were insured by need-based 
government plans or were uninsured. About a third received four-year college degrees 
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and about another third did not receive any education beyond high school. Roughly half 
the respondents were women.  
[Table 1.1. Descriptive Statistics for Study Measures] 
Being insured under one’s own name was correlated with other measures of 
socioeconomic standing. Over 85% of people with their own health insurance were 
employed full-time and contributed over half of their households’ total incomes on 
average. They were also more likely to have attended college. I show in Table 1.2 that 
more married women than men were insured as a dependent. In concordance with the 
findings by the Kaiser Family Foundation (2011) women in my sample were more likely 
than men to be insured on another’s plan. About 44% of married women, compared to 
16% of married men, were insured as dependents. The educational attainment and income 
of these men were also not too different from the married men who were insured under 
their own names. Men who were enrolled as a dependent still have higher earnings and 
were more likely to have attended college than their female counterparts. While the 
insurance-dependent men earned less on average, the proportion with some post-
secondary education was slightly higher.  
[Table 1.2.  Descriptive Statistics of Risk Population by Insurance Status and Gender] 
While individuals who were insured under their own plans contributed proportionally 
more to total household income, those who were insured through their spouses also made 
economic contributions to the household. The sizes of these contributions however, 
differed by gender. Men who were enrolled on another’s insurance plan contributed 41% 
of the total household income, on average. Women who were enrolled on another’s 
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insurance plan, on the other hand, contributed on average, less than 20%. Table 1.3 
shows the differences in economic contribution to the household by insurance status and 
gender. These percentages represent the average monthly earnings of an individual as a 
proportion of the monthly total household income during the marriage. Total household 
income includes income from means-tested cash transfers and income from property. 
[Table 1.3. Earnings Contribution to Total Household Income by Insurance and Gender 
(%)] 
 
Main Results 
The following section tests and reports the results of the four main hypotheses of this 
paper. I test each hypothesis with a separate Cox proportionate hazard model (Models 1 
to 4) in the same order that I presented in the background section.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Married individuals who are insured through their spouses’ health plans 
have lower rates of divorce 
[Table 1.4. Hypothesis Test 1: Divorce Hazard on Insurance Status] 
At any point in time, married individuals who were insured on their spouses’ plans were 
indeed significantly less likely to divorce or separate than those who were covered under 
their own policies. Being dependent on one’s spouse for health insurance lowered the 
divorce hazard by almost 70%. The odds of divorce associated with being insured by a 
spouse (0.321) were statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Table 1.4 shows the odds 
ratios for covariates related to insurance and family income. Logged family monthly 
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income had a significant negative association with divorce hazard consistent with prior 
findings (Bumpass, Martin, & Sweet, 1991). The insurance coefficients remain 
significant indicating that their association with divorce could not be entirely explained 
by the family’s income.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Not having an employment-based source of health insurance coverage 
outside the marriage further lowers the risk of divorce for people enrolled in their 
spouses’ plans.  
[Table 1.5.  Hypothesis Test 2: Divorce Hazard on Insurance Status and Access to 
Employment-based Option] 
Model 2 confirms that not having an employment-based source of insurance was 
associated with further declines in divorce hazards among individuals who were insured 
by their spouses. This model interacts insurance status with access to employer-sponsored 
plans as people may have had the option to enroll in their own employers’ health plans 
but had to forgo them in favor of their spouses’ family policies. Table 1.5 reports the 
divorce odds ratio for each insurance status group who had and who did not have an 
employment-based option. The divorce ratio of someone insured under their spouses’ 
plans with an option for an employer-sponsored plan was 0.433 relative to persons who 
were insured under their own names. Individuals insured under their spouses’ plans 
without access to employer-sponsored plans had divorce hazard ratios of 0.179. Both 
coefficients were significant at the alpha 0.005 level. I test whether not having access to 
an employer-sponsored plan significantly lowered the divorce hazards among people who 
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were insured by their spouses in the lower panel of Table 1.5. Not having an insurance 
option outside the marriage further lowered divorce odds by 0.412 and this difference is 
statistically significant at the alpha 0.005 level. Logged family monthly income had a 
significant negative association with divorce in Model 2. However, similarly to the first 
model, family income did not completely moderate the relationship between insurance 
and divorce.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Women who are insured through their spouses have lower rates of divorce 
than men who are insured through their spouses 
[Table 1.6. Hypothesis Test 3: Divorce Hazard on Insurance Status and Gender] 
Model 3 shows that divorce hazards associated with being covered by a spouse’s health 
insurance did not differ by gender. Men who were insured on their spouses’ plans had 
divorce risks that were 0.475 that of men who were primary subscribers. Women who 
were insured by another had hazards of 0.373 of the same reference group (Table 1.6). 
The difference in hazard ratio between men and women were not statistically significant. 
Model 3 reveals another interesting gender difference. A woman who had her own source 
of health insurance was associated with a significantly higher hazard of divorce than a 
man who was the primary subscriber. This is consistent with some findings from prior 
research on the positive relationship between women’s financial independence and 
likelihood of divorce (South and Spitze, 1986; Greenstein, 1995). While a wife’s earnings 
can increase gains and stability to a marriage by augmenting the household income 
(McLanahan, 2004), empirical evidence also shows that wives who earned more than 
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their husbands were more likely to experience divorce (Kalmijin et al., 2007). Because 
the divorce risks of women who were primary subscribers were so high, the differences 
in divorce hazards between primary and dependent insurance subscribers were greater 
among women (1.580 vs 0.373) than among men (1.000 vs 0.475). 
 
Hypothesis 4: Not having an alternative source of health insurance outside the marriage 
lowers divorce risk for women more so than for men 
[Table 1.7. Hypothesis 4: Divorce Hazard on Insurance Status, Access to Employment-
based Option, and Gender] 
The divorce hazards of spouse-insured women who did not have an employment-based 
source were significantly lower than their male counterparts. The divorce hazards of men 
who were insured by their spouses and did not have employment-based options were 
0.489. The hazards for similar women were 0.179 (Table 1.7). The difference in divorce 
odds between these two groups was statistically significant at the alpha 0.05 level. The 
reference group for Model 4 consists of male primary subscribers who were most likely 
to have employer-sponsored insurance.  
Having an outside option for insurance was not associated with higher divorce 
hazards among men when they were already insured by their wives (Table 1.7). The story 
is different for women. The divorce hazards of women who were insured by their spouses 
but also had access to employment-based plans outside their marriages were significantly 
higher than spouse-insured women who did not have alternative sources through 
employment. The odds ratio of 0.412 associated with having access to employer-
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sponsored insurance plans among women who were insured through their spouses was 
statistically significant (Table 1.7). These coefficients’ significance persists even when 
family income is included as a covariate in Model 4. Taken together, these findings 
indicate that the insurance that a spouse provides may act as a deterrent to marital 
disruption in addition to other economic predictors of divorce such as employment and 
income.  
DISCUSSION 
This paper tests two main ideas. Does being dependent on a spouse for health insurance 
lower the hazard of divorce? And, does this relationship between health insurance 
dependency and divorce differ between men and women? The results affirm that on 
average, people who were insured through their spouses’ health plans had lower rates of 
divorce. Incorporating employment status into the baseline model shows that higher 
levels of dependency on their spouses for health insurance coverage further led to 
diminished risks of divorce or separation. These results are in concordance with the 
findings from researchers of employer-provided health benefits and job mobility. Not 
having an alternative source for health care outside their current arrangement—
employment and marriage—made individuals less likely to terminate their jobs and 
marriages.  
The results further demonstrate that the relationship between insurance 
dependency and marital stability differed by gender. The gendered relationship between 
health insurance and divorce mirrors the dynamics of income and marital stability. Risk 
of divorce rises along with wives’ contribution to the family income in excess of their 
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husbands’ with the most stable marriages being those where the husband is the primary 
earner (Heckert, Nowak, & Snyder, 1998; Kalmijn, Loeve, & Manting, 2007; Ono, 
1998). Likewise, I find divorce rates are the highest among women who had access to 
health insurance independent of their husbands. While women’s employment may have 
transitioned from being a marital destabilizer to a stabilizer in recent decades 
(Oppenheimer, 1994; Sayer et al., 2011), it appears that securing the family health 
insurance still remains within the male domain.  
There are several limitations to this study. I recognize that marital decisions may 
not always be unilateral and often result from joint decision-making between the two 
spouses. A wife may be motivated to stay together in consideration for the husband’s lack 
of health insurance. Whatever mechanisms at play, my results show the different divorce 
outcomes based on an individual’s insurance situation. While the monthly health 
insurance and marital status measurements in the SIPP are strengths in determining a 
relationship between the two, I also note that couples often obtain legal divorce decrees 
months after they make their decisions. The health insurance situation of the two 
individuals involved in the failing marriage may have changed since beginning divorce 
proceedings. Research has shown increases in married women’s labor force participation 
in the periods prior to divorce (Gray, 1995). Similarly, the insurance-dependent partner 
may be motivated to secure other sources for health insurance in anticipation of the 
change in marital status. Applications for divorce specifically address the issue of 
healthcare coverage and divorcing individuals are fully aware of the termination of 
benefits through their soon-to-be former spouse. If this is the case, the effects on divorce 
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rates associated with insurance-dependence may be an upper-bound more relevant to 
couples who were not able to secure independent coverage the month immediately prior 
to the finalization of the divorce. My sensitivity analyses with lagged insurance statuses 
of two, three, and six months indeed show that the longer the lag, the coefficient 
decreases in magnitude. Nevertheless, hypotheses tests still yield the same conclusion; 
insurance-dependence lower risk of marital disruption and that this association is more 
pronounced for women than for men.  
The health status of an individual may change the association between insurance 
and divorce. Having poor health may increase the dependency on a spouse’s health 
insurance plan as having continuous coverage become more important and poor health 
can also negatively impact employment prospects. The SIPP, unfortunately, does not 
have good measures of health to adequately capture the respondents’ need for health 
insurance. In a sensitivity analysis, I used self-rated health rated on a five-point scale both 
as a control and as a moderator for the relationship between insurance and divorce. This 
variable in the 2004 SIPP was problematic as less than 3% of the analytic sample 
indicated that they were not in good health and the SIPP only recorded the variable twice 
during the four-year data collection period. Self-rated health in this case, was neither a 
predictor of divorce nor an influential moderator.  
Lastly, the SIPP’s short study period of 48 months can also be another limitation 
of the data. The study can only prospectively observe the risk of divorce of a couple only 
for a four-year window of their marriage. It cannot account for the entire history of all 
couples’ marriages by tracking them from their wedding till its dissolution through 
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divorce or death. The divorce and separation hazards are estimated from this longitudinal 
data’s four-year study period and are extrapolated throughout couples’ marital life 
courses.  
Despite these limitations, this paper contributes to the broader literature 
examining the determinants of marital stability. It distinguishes health insurance’s 
influence on divorce from other measures of socioeconomic status such as education, 
income, and employment. If private insurance coverage was simply an artifact of these 
characteristics, we would expect that those with stable employer-based coverage would 
have the lowest rates of divorce. On the contrary, the analyses demonstrate that spouse-
insured persons who have less economic options are the ones who are the least likely to 
divorce. While the traditional economic resources contribute to lower divorce rates by 
making the marriage more attractive, it is the aversion to the risk of losing health 
insurance that deters people away from divorce. It is a subtle but an important distinction 
especially when studying health policies that aim to guarantee health coverage to more 
people. The incentive to stay in marriages for health insurance may be stronger for those 
with lower prospects of securing and maintaining private health insurance through 
employment. The negative association between insurance dependence and divorce that 
we see in this paper may likely to be stronger among people with low socioeconomic 
status; these people may rely more on their spouses to protect themselves from the risk of 
losing health coverage.  
This paper also underscores the gendered patterns in marriage and economic 
dependence. The reduction in divorce rates associated with insurance dependence is 
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stronger among women than for men. It is consistent with research showing that 
American marriages are still governed by gendered social norms; men are often expected 
to resume the responsibility of financially providing for the family through labor force 
participation outside the household.  
This paper draws attention to the strong connection between health care and 
marriage. Acquiring health insurance in the United States is largely dependent on work 
and marriage—two things that are valued in American society (Kaiser Family 
Foundation, 2011). The system rewards adults who seek and maintain good employment 
or who remain married to partners who can provide spousal coverage. When affordable 
and dependable health care is not guaranteed, people are incentivized to conform to the 
social behaviors that American policies promote. Whether or not sociologists and health 
researchers agree that access to good health care should be so intricately tied to family 
values, they cannot neglect the inevitable influences that they have on each other. 
Divorce is only one of many family processes that could be affected by health care 
policies in the United States.  The findings in this study call attention to the importance of 
taking into consideration family dynamics when developing and evaluating health care 
policies. Marriage, childbirth, divorce, remarriage, and transitions to adulthood are all 
significant life events that could be shaped by policies. Understanding the relationship 
between health policies and family processes is crucial to working toward a more 
effective health care system that improves the overall health and happiness of the 
population.  
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Table 1.1 Descriptive Statistics for Study Measures (N = 17,388) 
 
Population at Risk M or % SD 
Insurance Status     
  Insured under own name 50.84   
  Insured under someone else's plan 31.64   
  Gov't Insurance (Medicare, Medicaid) 5.64   
  Uninsured 11.88   
Race/ethnicity     
  Non-Hispanic White 73.55   
  African American 7.66   
  Hispanic 12.58   
  Asian 3.84   
  Other 2.47   
Educational Attainment     
  Less than High School 9.43   
  High School Diploma or Equiv. 21.06   
  Associate degree or some college 37.47   
  Bachelors' degree 20.95   
  Advanced degree 11.09   
Children     
  Not living with Children 36.85   
  One child 23.09   
  Two children 24.90   
  Three children 15.16   
Age   41.85 10.61 
Family Monthly Income 6,712.19 5,116.87 
Gender: 0 = male, 1 = female 0.53   
Note: Population at risk at first reference month (November 2003 if already married or first 
month of marriage). Values weighted to represent the US population. 
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Table 1.2 Descriptive Statistics of Risk Population by Insurance Status and Gender (N = 17,388) 
 
Insurance Status 
Sample Size (%) Mean Age 
Avg. Monthly Earnings 
(USD) 
Proportion with some 
college education (%) 
Men 
(n=8,091) 
Women 
(n=9,297) 
Men 
(n=8,091) 
Women 
(n=9,297) 
Men 
(n=8,091) 
Women 
(n=9,297) 
Men 
(n=8,091) 
Women 
(n=9,297) 
Insured under own name 66.8 36.8 42.9 41.9
a
 4,838 2,902
a
 75.9 76.6 
Insured under  
someone else's plan 
17.0 44.6 43.9
b
 41.8
a
 3,397
b
 1,393
a,b
 77.7 72.5
a,b
 
Gov't Insurance  
(Medicare, Medicaid) 
4.4 6.8 45.0
b
 38.2
a,b
 737
b
 390
a,b
 44.3
b
 40.6
b
 
Uninsured 11.9 11.9 38.9
b
 37.9
b
 1,873
b
 742
a,b
 42.4
b
 42.9
b
 
Note: Population at risk at first reference month (November 2003 if already married or first month of marriage). Values are weighted to 
represent the US population.  
a
Denotes statistical difference between men and women at significance level, 0.05. 
b
Denotes difference from being self-insured at significance 
level 0.05. 
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Table 1.3 Earnings Contribution to Total Household Income by Insurance and Gender 
in Percentages 
 
Insurance Status Men Women Overall 
Insured under own name 63.11 41.91 54.96 
Insured under someone else's plan 41.96 18.64 24.52 
Gov't Insurance (Medicare, Medicaid) 26.39 13.45 18.14 
Uninsured 58.97 22.47 39.58 
Note: Population at risk at first reference month (November 2003 if already married or first 
month of marriage). N = 17,388 (men n = 8,091; women n = 9,297). Values are weighted to 
represent the US population. Total household income includes income from property and 
means-tested cash transfers.   
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Table 1.4 Test of Hypothesis 1 
 
 
  
Model 1. Cox Regression of Divorce Hazard on Insurance Status (hazards in odds 
ratios) 
Insurance Status 
    
  Insured under own name (reference) a  
  Insured under someone else's plan 0.32*** b 
  Gov't Insurance (Medicare, Medicaid) 0.59***   
  Uninsured 0.73*   
        
Logged family monthly income 0.44***   
Note: Model includes age, age-squared, race, education, children, higher-order 
marriage, and marriage duration as controls. Coefficients are not shown. N=17,388 
(men n=8,091; women n=9,297). Values are weighted to represent the US population.   
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .005. 
Test of Hypothesis 1: Married individuals who are insured through their spouses’ 
health plans have lower rates of divorce 
  Key Coefficient for Hypothesis Test     
a Insured under own name (reference group) 1.00   
b Insured under someone else's plan 0.32***   
  Ratio of b to a 0.32***   
 Note: P-values of one-sided t-tests are corrected adjusted for False Discovery Rate 
(Benjamini and Hochberg 1995).  
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .005. 
 
 
46 
 
Table 1.5 Test of Hypothesis 2 
 
  
Model 2. Cox Regression of Divorce Hazard on Insurance Status and Access to 
Employment-based Option (hazards in odds ratios)   
Two-way interaction between insurance status and access to 
employment-based option 
  
    
  Insurance Status 
Access to 
Employment-based 
Option 
  
    
  Insured under own name Yes (reference)     
  Insured under own name No 0.59*     
  Insured under someone else's plan Yes 0.43*** a   
  
Insured under someone else's plan No 0.18*** 
b   
  Gov't Insurance (Medicare, Medicaid) Yes 1.03     
  
Gov't Insurance (Medicare, Medicaid) No 0.37*** 
    
  Uninsured Yes 1.03     
  Uninsured No 0.39***     
            
Logged family monthly income   0.41***     
Note: Model includes age, age-squared, race, education, children, higher-order 
marriage, and marriage duration as controls. Coefficients are not shown. N=17,388 
(men n=8,091; women n=9,297). Values are weighted to represent the US 
population.   
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .005. 
 
     
Test of Hypothesis 2: Not having an employment-based source of health insurance 
coverage outside the marriage further lowers the divorce risk of people enrolled in 
their spouses’ plans.    
  Key Coefficients for Hypothesis Test         
a Insured under someone else's plan & has employment-based option 0.43***     
b Insured under someone else's plan & has no employment-based option 0.18***     
  Ratio of b to a   0.41***     
 Note: P-values of one-sided t-tests are corrected adjusted for False Discovery Rate 
(Benjamini and Hochberg 1995).  
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .005. 
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Table 1.6 Test of Hypothesis 3 
 
  
Model 3. Cox Regression of Divorce Hazard on Insurance Status and Gender (hazards in 
odds ratios) 
Two-way interaction between insurance status and gender     
  Insurance Status Gender     
  Insured under own name Male (reference)   
  Insured under own name Female 1.58***   
  Insured under someone else's plan Male 0.48** a 
  
Insured under someone else's plan Female 0.37*** b 
  Gov't Insurance (Medicare, Medicaid) Male 0.41*   
  
Gov't Insurance (Medicare, Medicaid) Female 0.88   
  Uninsured Male 0.91   
  Uninsured Female 0.89   
          
Logged family monthly income   0.44***   
Note: Model includes age, age-squared, race, education, children, higher-order marriage, 
and marriage duration as controls; coefficients are not shown. N=17,388 (men n=8,091; 
women n=9,297). Values are weighted to represent the US population.   
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .005. 
  
Test of Hypothesis 3: Women who are insured on their spouse’s health plans have lower 
rates of divorce than men who are insured by their spouse 
  Key Coefficients for Hypothesis Test       
a Insured under someone else's plan & male   0.48**   
b Insured under someone else's plan & female   0.37***   
  Ratio of b to a   0.78   
 Note: P-values of one-sided t-tests are corrected adjusted for False Discovery Rate 
(Benjamini and Hochberg 1995).  
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .005. 
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 Table 1.7 Test of Hypothesis 4   
Model 4. Cox Regression of Divorce Hazard on Insurance Status, Access to Employment-based Option, 
and Gender (hazards in odds ratios) 
Three-way interaction between insurance status, access to employment-based option, and gender 
  
  Insurance Status 
Access to Employment-
based Option 
Gender     
  
Insured under own name 
Yes Male (reference)   
  Yes Female 1.70***   
  No Male 0.75   
  No Female 0.75   
      
  
Insured under someone 
else's plan 
Yes Male 0.44* a 
  Yes Female 0.61* b 
  No Male 0.49 c 
  No Female 0.19*** d 
      
  
Gov't Insurance 
(Medicare, Medicaid)  
Yes Male 0.22   
  Yes Female 2.03*   
  No Male 0.41*   
  No Female 0.49***   
      
  
Uninsured  
Yes Male 1.13   
  Yes Female 1.49   
  No Male 0.52*   
  No Female 0.47**   
            
Logged family monthly 
income 
    0.40***   
Note: Model includes age, age-squared, race, education, children, higher-order marriage, and marriage 
duration as controls. Coefficients are not shown. N=17,388 (men n=8,091; women n=9,297). Values are 
weighted to represent the US population.   
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .005. 
  
Test of Hypothesis 4: Not having an alternative source of health insurance outside the marriage lowers 
divorce risk for women more so than for men 
  Key Coefficients for Hypothesis Test         
c Insured under someone else's plan & has no employment-based option & male 0.49   
d Insured under someone else's plan & has no employment-based option & female 0.18***   
  Ratio of d to c     0.37*   
            
Not having an alternative source of health insurance outside the marriage lowers divorce risk for men   
a Insured under someone else's plan & has employment-based option & male 0.44*   
c Insured under someone else's plan & has no employment-based option & male 0.49   
  Ratio of c to a     1.12   
      
Not having an alternative source of health insurance outside the marriage lowers divorce risk for women 
b Insured under someone else's plan & has employment-based option & female 0.61*   
d Insured under someone else's plan & has no employment-based option & female 0.18***   
  Ratio of d to b     0.30***   
 Note: P-values of one-sided t-tests are corrected adjusted for False Discovery Rate (Benjamini and Hochberg 
1995). 
 *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .005. 
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Chapter 2: Life-Course Mortality Consequences of Public Health Insurance 
in the United States 
 
ABSTRACT 
Forty-four percent of the Affordable Care Act’s 1.1 trillion-dollar expenditure is 
projected to be spent on expanding Medicaid. The impact of Medicaid on its recipients 
and on the broader population has been a matter of contentious debate since its inception 
in 1965. My contribution to this debate is two-fold. First, I examine infant mortality 
improvements between 1959 and 1979 that accompanied states’ Medicaid participation. 
Here, I exploit the variation in when each of the 50 States adopted Medicaid to estimate 
its impact on national infant mortality rates. The annual rate of infant mortality decline 
doubled with Medicaid participation. Mortality predictions without Medicaid result in 
78,000 excess infant deaths between 1965 and 1980. Second, I examine Medicaid’s 
lasting consequences that persist into adulthood.  Cohorts born post-Medicaid 
experienced greater improvements in mortality even after aging out of eligibility. 
Medicaid is still shaping the US population today. A cohort born in 1970 without 
Medicaid would have 13,700 fewer people aged 40 in 2010. 
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Title II of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) aims to expand Medicaid eligibility to 
an estimated 17 million more Americans (Congressional Budget Office 2011). This is the 
largest initiative for public health insurance since the creation of Medicaid and Medicare 
as a part of the 1965 Social Security Amendments. Medicaid is a means-tested 
government insurance program aiming to provide health insurance to people who cannot 
afford to pay for private health policies. Researchers and policy-makers debate over 
whether this single-payer government-run insurance program is an effective way to 
deliver health care services to low-income and medically needy people (Kaiser Family 
Foundation 2013). Critics of Medicaid claim that this public insurance not only fails to 
adequately benefit its target population, but it also has detrimental effects on the privately 
insured (McDonough 2011). A large body of literature examining the effects of Medicaid 
on its recipients has emerged since the program’s inception (Baldwin et al. 1998; 
Braveman et al. 1993; Copeland and Meier 1987; Currie and Grogger 2002; Devany et al. 
1992; Guyer 1990; Howell 2001; Lykens and Jargowsky 2002; Moss and Carver 1998; 
Schor et al. 2007). However, few if any studies examine Medicaid’s contribution to 
general population health and its long-term consequences. In this paper, I examine 
changes in the rates of decline in states’ infant, childhood, and adult mortality associated 
with the availability of Medicaid at birth. I exploit the variation in States’ timing of 
Medicaid participation between 1966 and 1979 to address two research questions. (1) Did 
Medicaid reduce infant mortality rates at the population level? (2) Did the availability of 
Medicaid at birth have lasting consequences on mortality into adulthood?  Macro-level 
views of the consequences of large-scale health care reforms are informative as the 
policies often influence individuals outside their immediate targeted population. And 
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these health effects during early life may endure into adulthood. This paper is the first to 
follow birth cohorts over time to examine lasting mortality consequences associated with 
Medicaid.  
THEORY AND LITERATURE 
The first research question adds to the literature by examining the overall changes 
in infant mortality rate—recipients and non-recipients alike—associated with States’ 
Medicaid participation. Medicaid was one of the largest U.S. federal initiatives to 
disseminate medical innovations and health information to pregnant women and infants 
in the 1960s. By increasing the number of women who seek pre- and postnatal care, 
Medicaid aimed to improve nutrition and health behaviors among expectant and new 
mothers (David and Seigel 1983; Lee et al. 1980).  This in turn would lead to healthier 
infants and lower mortality rates among women who would not otherwise have had 
access to health care. Medicaid targeted low-income women and infants, a group that was 
more susceptible to infant mortality. Improving the health of this disadvantaged group 
would effectively lower the average infant mortality for the overall population.  
Medicaid may also have had spillover effects on women and infants who did not 
gain insurance coverage from the public program. Theories in diffusion suggest that as a 
greater proportion of women gain access to pre- and post-natal care, the health of all 
women would improve.  Health knowledge spreads through interpersonal networks as 
well as institutional organizations (Backer 1991; Tarde 1962; Green et al. 2009). 
Interaction with peers, friends, and family as well as health care providers influence how 
individuals approach their health (Christakis and Fowler 2007, 2009; Glanz et al. 2008). 
Social network effects on health behavior are not trivial. Groups of socially connected 
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people quit smoking in concert at different times despite the already ‘generalized 
knowledge’ of smoking’s adverse effects on health (Christakis and Fowler 2009). 
Medicaid connects more women with health care providers and encourages transfer of 
health knowledge from physicians to the public. As more women adopt good nutrition 
and refrain from risky health behaviors, the more likely they are to influence other 
women in their social networks, even those who always had access to health care 
services. 
Researchers, for the most part, agree that Medicaid increased insurance coverage 
and prenatal care utilization, but many disagree on the program’s impact on population 
health. While Medicaid fails to ensure that all persons who are eligible have health 
insurance (Braveman et al. 1993; Currie and Grogger 2002; Holahan and Zedlewski 
1991; Kenney and Haley 2001; Wilensky and Berk 1982), the introduction of the public 
health insurance program visibly improved insurance coverage and health care utilization 
in the United States. Prior to 1965, only half of low-income Americans had medical-
coverage (Copeland and Meier 1987) and despite having poorer health than their 
wealthier counterparts, low-income individuals and families used fewer medical services 
(Copeland and Meier 1987; Rowland et al. 1988; Wilensky and Berk 1982). In particular, 
88% of upper-income women reported seeing a physician during the first trimester of 
pregnancy compared to 58% of lower-income pregnant women (Andersen and Andersen 
1967; Copeland and Meier 1987). By the late 1970s when most states had adopted 
Medicaid, 24 million Americans and over a third of people in households with incomes 
below 125% FPL received health insurance through Medicaid (Oberg and Polich 1988; 
Wilensky and Berk 1982). Medicaid specifically targeted low-income pregnant women 
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and infants and their enrollee characteristics reflected this trait (Wilensky and Berk 
1982). Medicaid covered about three-quarters of low-income pregnant mothers and 
children under the age of 5, reducing the rate of uninsurance for these target groups to 
below the national average (Holahan and Zedlewski 1991). By 1980, the low-income 
group was utilizing medical services (hospital stays and physician visits) at an equivalent 
rate as the higher-income groups (Copeland and Meier 1987; Rowland et al. 1988; 
Wilensky and Berk 1982). 
Critics claim that greater insurance coverage and health care utilization through 
Medicaid do not necessarily translate into improved population health. Medicaid 
recipients may receive inferior medical care than those who are privately insured. The 
low pay-out to health care providers who treat Medicaid patients incentivize doctors to 
limit the number of Medicaid patients they are willing to accept (Decker 2012). Medicaid 
patients find themselves waiting longer for care and having a narrower selection of 
doctors (Bisgaier and Rhodes 2011; Merrick, et al. 2001). Several studies also show that 
Medicaid patients receive poorer quality care and face worse outcomes from the same 
doctor relative to comparable individuals with private insurance (Hwang et al. 2005; 
Wang et al. 2004). Criticisms against Medicaid’s effectiveness do not stop at the 
uninsured, low-income population that the program is designed to target. Medicaid 
induces eligible people who already have private insurance to switch to the arguably 
inferior public health insurance policy (Blumberg et al. 2000; Dubay and Kenney 1996; 
Wilensky and Berk 1982). Some further claim that health care providers shift the cost of 
caring for Medicaid patients onto privately insured patients (McDonough 2011).  
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Empirically measuring the health outcome of Medicaid is tricky as socioeconomic 
class—a well-established determinant of health (Cutler et al. 2008, Elo 2009; Link and 
Phelan 1995; Lynch et al. 2004; Smith 2007)—is explicitly tied to eligibility (Lyken and 
Jargowsky 2002). Copeland and Meier (1987) use Medicaid expenditures in their time-
series model to distinguish infant mortality decline attributable to increasing access to 
care from technological advances in medicine. They find a significant negative 
association between federal Medicaid expenditures and the infant mortality rate. 
However, their simple study design was inadequate to establish a convincing relationship 
between Medicaid and infant mortality. Grossman and Jacobowitz (1981) utilize 
disparate Medicaid eligibility rules to estimate the change in county-level neonatal 
mortality rate associated with the state’s Medicaid coverage. The paper attempts to 
control for the composition differences between counties by estimating the proportion of 
births to low-income mothers. They also include proportion of women with high-school 
degrees and the number of physicians per 1000 to control for socioeconomic differences 
between counties. Their analyses find little support for Medicaid in contributing to the 
decline in neonatal mortality rates between 1964 and 1977. The limitation of this study 
lies in its assumption that counties that share these few characteristics are essentially 
equal, apart from the availability of Medicaid and other maternal and infant health 
programs. Currie and Gruber (1994) find the most convincing evidence that Medicaid 
expansions in the 1980s contributed to reductions in infant mortality rates. They 
standardized States’ Medicaid expansions by simulating the proportion of women who 
would be eligible from a nationally representative sample of 3,000 women from the 
Current Population Survey each year. This method allowed the authors to effectively 
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isolate the effects of States’ extent of Medicaid expansions from the composition of their 
residents. 
In sum, the introduction of Medicaid in 1965 led to a greater proportion of 
pregnant women seeking prenatal care but the program’s contribution to overall 
population health is unclear. The literature is mostly focused on determining Medicaid’s 
health effects on its recipients. This paper contributes to this literature by examining 
Medicaid’s impact on the entire population.  
Population-level analyses of other high-income OECD countries show significant 
associations between infant mortality and the country’s health care system. Countries 
with publicly funded health care had lower infant mortality rates than similar countries 
whose health care services are generally private (Elola et al. 1995). National health care 
systems were associated with greater improvements in infant mortality after accounting 
for secular declines and changes in GDP (Macinko et al 2004). Between 1970 and 1996, 
public health care systems were associated with over 3 less infant deaths per 1000 live 
births as IMR fell from 16.63 to 6.20 per 1000. These publicly funded national health 
systems also attenuated the positive association between income inequality and infant 
mortality (Macinko et al 2004). While Medicaid is not a national health system, it gave 
access to public health care to a large subset of the US population.  The program 
specifically targeted groups who made large contributions to the national IMR. I expect 
Medicaid to have similarly positive associations with infant mortality improvements in 
the US.  
The second part of this paper shows that cohorts who were born after their states 
adopted Medicaid had greater improvements in probability of survival throughout 
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childhood and into adulthood compared to cohorts born immediately prior to Medicaid. 
Women who receive prenatal care and thus eat better and refrain from risky behaviors are 
more likely to give birth to healthier babies (Almond 2005; Oreopolous et al. 2008). 
These babies not only have higher chances of survival, but would also lead healthier lives 
throughout childhood and adulthood. If Medicaid improves infant health by 
disseminating health knowledge and behaviors to pregnant women, it would then lead to 
healthier newborns who would grow up to be healthier adults.    
While no study has examined the long-term consequences of being born into an 
era of Medicaid, many studies have made the connection between prenatal and early-life 
environmental conditions to later-life health outcomes. One of the most well-known of 
these studies finds a positive link between ischemic health disease mortality and infant 
mortality rates at the place and time of birth (Barker and Osmond 1986). Their study 
suggests that early-life living conditions and nutrition (measured by local infant mortality 
rates) have long-term consequences well into adulthood even when they move to another 
region. Another study find higher mortality rates throughout the life course among 
cohorts born during a macroeconomic recession (Van den Berg et al. 2006). Quasi-
experimental studies also find poorer health outcomes among birth cohorts born during 
the 1918 Influenza Pandemic and the 1944 Dutch Famine relative to cohorts born 
immediately before or after these sudden deteriorations in living conditions (Almond 
2006; Roseboom et al. 2001). The literature is strongly suggestive of initial conditions at 
birth having long-lasting health consequences. Medicaid explicitly aims to improve 
prenatal health and birth outcomes. Thus, I expect these wide-spread efforts to translate 
into improved health throughout the life-course.     
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HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Before delving into the analyses, I briefly describe the historical decline in infant 
mortality rates leading up to the advent of Medicaid and the policy context of States’ 
Medicaid participation during the period after 1965.  
   A rise in living standards, better nutrition, public sanitation, clean water supply, 
and public health campaigns contributed to dramatic reductions in infant mortality rates 
in the United States during the first half of the Twentieth Century (Condran and 
Crimmins-Gardner 1978; Cutler and Miller 1995; Deaton and Paxton 2001; Elo and 
Preston 1996; Ewbank and Preston 1990; Fogel 2004; McKeown 1976, 1979;  Meeker 
1972; Preston and Haines 1991; Szreter, 1988). After several decades of experiencing 
significant improvements, the year-to-year decline in infant mortality stalled to 0.5 
percent by 1950 (Corman and Grossman 1985). While mortality from common childhood 
infectious diseases had reached very low levels by 1950 (Armstrong et al. 1999) 
considerable national attention was focused on how infant health improvements in the US 
were lagging behind other developed nations (Committee on Maternal and Child Care 
1965; Falkner 1969; Lee et al. 1980; Shapiro et al. 1968). Many efforts were made to 
improve prenatal and neonatal medical technology as well as to make services more 
accessible (Corman and Grossman 1985). Medicaid, a means-tested public insurance 
program targeting low-income pregnant women and infants, was created by Title XIX of 
the Social Security Act in 1965. The period beginning 1965 experienced twentieth 
century’s second surge of infant mortality decline (Grossman and Jacobowitz 1981; Lee 
et al. 1980). Infant mortality declined 4.5 percent per year between 1965 and 1982 
(Corman and Grossman 1985). Increased access to care through Medicaid is often 
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credited as one of the contributors to the rapid decline in infant mortality rates in the 
decade after 1965 (Corman and Grossman 1985; Mason 1991). But no prior study has 
attempted to quantify mortality improvements due to Medicaid.  
The analyses in this paper estimate the change in mortality decline associated with 
Medicaid by comparing state’s annual mortality improvements pre- and post-Medicaid 
participation. This regression discontinuity framework utilizes States’ differences in 
when they adopted Medicaid. States began to join the federal Medicaid program over 
sixteen years beginning in 1966, a year after Medicaid was created by the Social Security 
Amendments of 1965.  
The program gave federal grants to states to provide health insurance to eligible 
persons.  The federal government gave considerable flexibility in when or whether each 
state could participate in the program. The federal government mandated participating 
states to provide coverage to pregnant mothers and infants that met income and asset 
requirements. The State and the federal government would be jointly responsible for the 
costs associated with Medicaid. States began to participate in Medicaid quickly after the 
Title XIX of the Social Security Act in 1965. Six states adopted Medicaid in 
January1966. 20 more followed later that year. Eleven joined in 1967, one joined in 1968, 
and by 1970, most of the states had adopted Medicaid.. Appendix A shows the dates of 
when each State implemented Medicaid. Arizona is the last of the States to adopt 
Medicaid in 1982. Appendix B displays the same data on the US map. The first states to 
adopt Medicaid in January 1966 were located throughout the entire nation. States in the 
Northeast were relatively early adopters except New Jersey who was among the last. 
Southern states were generally late in adopting Medicaid with some exceptions such as 
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Georgia, Oklahoma, and Louisiana. States’ timing of Medicaid adoption does not appear 
to follow the 1964 presidential election results. Heavily republican states such as 
Louisiana, Nebraska, Utah, Georgia, and Oklahoma were among the first to implement 
Medicaid in 1966. Democratic New Jersey and Alaska were among the last. I later show 
in my analysis that the timing had little bearing on states’ mortality improvements after 
Medicaid adoption.  
States’ timing of Medicaid implementation was also different from other public 
policies that the Johnson administration introduced to combat poverty in the 1960s and 
1970s. The Food Stamp Act of 1964 was the other major initiative targeting women and 
children to improve prenatal health and reduce infant mortality (Almond et al. 2011). 
However, the rollout of the Food Stamp Program did not coincide with states’ Medicaid 
implementation dates. The Food Stamp Program was implemented at the county-level 
and its implementation stretched out between 1961 and 1976. Thirty percent of the US 
population already had access to food stamps by the time the first states began to offer 
Medicaid in January 1966. About a quarter of the population gained access to food 
stamps after 1970 when all but two states had joined the Medicaid program. Furthermore, 
states’ Medicaid participation had little bearing on its counties’ food stamp participation 
start date. Most notably, most counties in New York, Oklahoma, and Massachusetts 
began to offer food stamps relatively late, despite being early adopters of Medicaid. 
Many counties in Texas and California did not offer food stamps till after 1970. Thus, the 
exact timing of Medicaid implementation appears exogenous to other prenatal and infant 
health policy initiatives that occurred during this period.   
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DATA 
I rely on the US Vital Statistics micro-data from the National Center for Health Statistics 
(NCHS) for my analyses. I examine the mortality patterns for birth cohorts born between 
1959 and 1979—the 20-year period surrounding the introduction of Medicaid in 1965.  I 
start my analysis in 1959 when Hawaii became the last state to join the US. I use the 
natality micro-data for births between 1959 and 1979 to calculate the number of births by 
year for each state. The NCHS allocates births to the state of the mother’s residence and 
does not include births to US citizens outside the United States. To derive the age-
specific mortality rates for cohorts born between 1959 and 1979, I use the mortality 
micro data from 1959 to 2010. The NCHS constructed the mortality microdata from 
death certificates filed in vital statistics offices of each State. Mortality data for New 
Jersery is missing for the years, 1962 and 1963. In 1972, NCHS processed only a 50 
percent sample of death records. I have multiplied the number of deaths in 1972 by a 
factor of two in my analyses.  
I limit the analyses in this paper to the white US population. The US Vital 
Statistics changed the way it categorized race in their birth and death certificates in 1968. 
Prior to 1968, people were categorized as either white or non-white. After 1968, the non-
white population was classified into sub-groups. The exact list of sub-groups changed 
multiple times between 1968 and 2010. The changes in how the data classifies race 
makes it difficult to compare minority groups across the years. In addition, the number of 
non-white being born and dying in some states were so small that the age-specific 
mortality rates quickly became unreliable.  
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ANALYTIC STRATEGY 
I exploit the variation in State’s timing of Medicaid participation to examine the 
improvements in US mortality rates attributed to the public insurance program. I estimate 
the change in the annual rate of mortality decline after Medicaid adoption using state 
fixed effects weighted by the number of births from each state. All regression models 
have panel-corrected standard errors and they also correct for heteroskedasticity. This 
method relies on Medicaid adoption timing to be exogenous to other factors that may 
influence mortality rates. I evaluate several factors that may undermine this framework.  
First, states’ baseline infant mortality in 1965 had no relation to when they joined 
the Medicaid program. Utah who had the lowest infant mortality rate adopted Medicaid at 
the same time as West Virginia who had the highest infant mortality. A low correlation 
coefficient across all states further confirms that states’ infant mortality rates in 1965 did 
not determine its Medicaid participation.  
Second, Medicaid adoption year did not determine how much improvement a 
state experienced after participation. I separately examined each state’s change in the rate 
of infant mortality decline after Medicaid implementation.  Implementation year was not 
correlated with the magnitude or significance of their IMR improvements. For example, 
Illinois, Indiana, and Iowa all experienced statistically significant IMR improvements of 
about -0.53 deaths per 1000 per year after they adopted Medicaid. Their adoption dates 
were 1966, 1970, and 1968 respectively. Thirty-three out of the forty-eight states that 
joined Medicaid prior to 1970 had a statistically significant infant mortality improvement 
that coincided with their Medicaid participation years. And, these thirty-three states’ 
Medicaid adoption dates were spread across all four years between 1966 and 1970.  
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Third, systematic migration of would-be mothers of healthy babies into states 
offering Medicaid is unlikely. Interstate migration flows of a demographic group that 
would produce the healthiest babies (college-educated persons between the ages 25 to 39) 
have no relations to States’ timing of Medicaid participation.  California, an early 
adopter, and Florida, a late adopter, were among the top recipients of the young, college 
educated population in the late 1960s (Goworowska and Gardner 2012).  Young, single, 
college-educated people consistently out-migrated from Minnesota and Alabama despite 
one being an early Medicaid adopter and the other, a late adopter. Furthermore, the 
magnitudes of these flows are small. Thirteen percent of persons aged 25 to 39 moved to 
a different state between 1965 and 1970. Out of the thirteen percent, less than thirty 
percent were college educated.  
Lastly, infant mortality rate declines associated with state Medicaid participation 
remain significant, independent of period-specific effects. The stalling infant mortality 
improvements in the 1950s and early 1960s drew the attention of policy makers. The 
federal enactment of the Medicaid program was accompanied by increased funding to the 
NIH for prenatal and neonatal research (Shapiro 1981). An influential medical innovation 
that coincides with several states’ Medicaid adoption can overstate IMR improvements 
attributed to Medicaid. To test this, I add a term to indicate whether the birth occurred 
before or after a particular year between 1960 and 1970 in a series of regressions. For 
example, the first of this series will add infant mortality rate on a dummy variable for 
post-1960 births to the original model. The inclusion of these terms did not substantially 
change the magnitude or the significance of infant mortality reductions attributed to State 
Medicaid participation.  
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RESULTS 
Research Question 1: Is Medicaid associated with greater declines in US infant mortality 
rates?  
I examine the change in the annual rate of infant mortality decline after States’ 
implementation of Medicaid to address my first research question. I calculate the infant 
mortality rate for each state and year between 1959 and 1979 as follows. 
IMRy,s = Number of deaths for infants under age one residing in state s, in year y / 1000 
live births to mothers who are residents of state s, in year y 
Figure 2.1 shows the declining trend of US infant mortality rates between 1959 
and 1979. Confirming prior studies (Corman and Grossman 1985; Grossman and 
Jacobowitz 1981; Lee et al. 1980) the national infant mortality rate shows an accelerated 
decline during the period after 1965. The infant mortality rate decreased on average 1.2 
percent (at a rate of 0.28 infant deaths /1000 live births) per year between 1959 and 1965. 
Between 1965 and 1979, the infant mortality rate decreased 4.4 percent (0.72 infant 
deaths/1000 live births) per year. It is also during this latter period that States began to 
participate in the federal Medicaid program. Six States were the first to implement 
Medicaid in January 1966. Twenty more joined by the end of the year and eleven States 
implemented Medicaid the following year in 1967. By 1970, 48 States were offering 
Medicaid to their residents.  
In Figure 2.2, I show the changes in the annual rates of infant mortality after 
Medicaid implementation for each state. The sizes of the circles in the graph represent the 
number of births. Both large and small states saw significant mortality improvements 
after Medicaid. And these improvements do not depend on which year the states joined 
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the program. Thirty-three out of 50 states experienced faster declines in infant mortality 
after Medicaid. Montana, Idaho, Mississippi, West Virginia and the New England states 
experienced the largest improvements.  The two largest states, New York and California, 
saw moderate improvements. The 17 states that did not have significant improvements in 
infant mortality are scattered throughout the West, Midwest, and the South. Texas is the 
largest state that did not appear to have faster mortality declines after Medicaid adoption. 
Figure 2.3 descriptively shows faster improvements in infant mortality after each 
state’s Medicaid implementation relative to the years leading up to Medicaid. The graph 
shows average logged ratios (weighted by number of live births) of IMR relative to the 
IMR the year before Medicaid took effect. Figure 2.3 accounts for variations in states’ 
timing of Medicaid and their baseline IMR levels. The rate of IMR decline appears to be 
almost three times as fast during the seven years following Medicaid than during the 
seven year leading up to the program’s implementation.  
Table 2.1 describes the weighted yearly rate of decline in infant mortality during 
the years before and after States’ Medicaid participation. Infant mortality declined at a 
rate of 0.38 deaths per 1000 births per year during the years before Medicaid 
implementation. This rate increased to 0.71 deaths per 1000 births per year after the 
introduction of Medicaid. The model estimates incremental mortality improvement of 
0.33 deaths per 1000 births per year after Medicaid implementation. All coefficients are 
significant at the 0.001 level. The mortality improvements associated with Medicaid 
adoption is not trivial. Had infant mortality improvements stayed constant at pre-
Medicaid rates, the IMR among US whites would be 15.57 in 1979—about 4.11 deaths 
per 1000 in excess of the estimated 11.46 with the presence of Medicaid (Figure 2.2).  
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This translates to approximately 78,000 white babies between 1966 and 1979 that would 
have not survived infanthood.  
 
Research Question 2: Did the availability of Medicaid at birth have lasting consequences 
on mortality throughout childhood and into adulthood?  
To address my second research question, I examine changes in the cumulative mortality 
between cohorts born before and after Medicaid in ten-year age periods. The eldest age 
group in this analysis is the 30 to 39 age period. I calculate age-specific mortality 
probabilities from life tables of cohorts born between 1959 and 1979. I then derive the 
cumulative mortality probabilities for each ten-year age period from each birth cohort. 
Figure 2.4 shows the mortality trends of cohorts born between 1959 and 1979 by ten-year 
age periods. Unlike infant mortality, mortality for older age groups did not experience 
steady and constant declines during this period.  In fact, mortality rates appear to increase 
after 1970 (Murphy et al. 2013). Mortality data ends in 2010 when the 1970 birth cohort 
is 40 years old. Constricted by data limitations and possible confounding effects from 
later mortality trends, I limit this section of the analysis to the 1959-1970 birth cohorts. 
All states except Arizona and Alaska had implemented Medicaid by the end of 1970.  
I estimate the change in mortality probability associated with the availability of 
Medicaid in the state at the time of birth. The regressions also include state fixed-effects 
with panel-corrected standard errors and corrections for heteroskedasticity. All age 
groups displayed improvements in mortality associated with the availability of Medicaid 
at birth. Table 2.2 presents the change in the annual rate of mortality improvement 
associated with Medicaid implementation at the state level. All coefficients in Table 2.2 
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are significant at the 0.001 level. Cohorts born after Medicaid became available in their 
states experienced greater rates of mortality improvements at all age groups than cohorts 
born prior to Medicaid implementation. The largest differences between the pre- and 
post-Medicaid cohorts appear in the 1-9 and 20-29 age groups. The cumulative mortality 
improvement rate increased by over 300 percent from 0.005 to 0.022 and 0.01 to 0.034 
percent per year respectively. While not as large, the rate of mortality decline at ages 10 
to 19 and 30 to 39 still accelerated significantly after Medicaid implementation. The 
annual rate of improvement increased from 0.011 to 0.017 and 0.023 to 0.044 percent per 
year respectively. Figure 2.5 presents expected mortality probabilities for cohorts born 
between 1964 and 1970 with and without the estimated effects of Medicaid. The 
mortality probabilities are lower in predictions that account for Medicaid in all four age 
groups and the differences becomes larger in more recent cohorts.  
 These percentage differences may appear small but their implication on the US 
population is substantial. The final component of this paper show how the 1970 birth 
cohort would differ without the mortality effects of Medicaid estimated in the prior 
models. Table 2.3 presents the 1970 cohort’s predicted under-40 mortality schedule with 
and without the estimated effects of Medicaid. The number of survivors at the beginning 
of each age group (lx) is based on the actual number of white births in the United States 
in 1970. I apply the different age-specific mortality probabilities to the 1970 birth cohort 
and compare the resulting number of survivors at age 40 in 2010. Without mortality 
improvements associated with Medicaid, out of the 3.1 million people born in 1970, 
13,681 fewer people would be alive in 2010. 13,681 people represent an 8.7 percent 
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increase in under-40 mortality for the 1970 cohort and 0.4 percent of all live births in 
1970.  
LIMITATIONS 
The analysis is presented in the paper has several limitations. First, the analysis is limited 
to the US white population. The poor data quality for the non-white population in the late 
1950s and 1960s does not produce dependable results. Many states during this period had 
very few non-white births and even fewer deaths. Age-specific death rates deteriorate 
into noisy trends for many smaller states. In addition, the NCHS changed the 
categorization of non-whites several times during this period. As the immigrant 
population grew in the 1960s and 1970s, the Vital Statistics separated Hispanics and 
Asians from the African American population. During the early years, all non-white 
racial and ethnic groups were reported as simply, non-white. Medicaid likely had a 
greater influence on the non-white population. A greater proportion of non-whites would 
have been eligible for Medicaid as poverty and single motherhood were more prevalent. 
Infant mortality among non-whites during this period was also substantially higher and 
increasing their access to medical care may have had a greater impact on infant mortality. 
Given these considerations, the changes in US mortality attributed to Medicaid in this 
paper may be a conservative estimate of its actual effect.  
The second limitation is the analyses’ assumption that deaths occurred in the state 
of the person’s birth. I derive the age-specific death rates using actual number of deaths 
by year, age, and state and the cohort’s corresponding number of births in the same state. 
These age-specific death rates inflate from deaths of persons born out-of-state and deflate 
when the net-migration of people born in those states are below zero. Limiting the 
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analysis to the white population has substantially reduced inflation from the large growth 
of immigration into the United States during the 1970s and 1980s. Immigration from 
Europe and Canada remained relatively constant during this period at rate of 
approximately 100,000 per year (Fix et al. 1994). The cumulative number of these 
immigrants would have been less than 1% of the US population in 1990. Furthermore, 
they would have contributed even less to mortality at younger ages which is the focus of 
this paper.  Moving to another state after birth can also affect States’ mortality schedules. 
It is unlikely that migration patterns coincide with the availability of Medicaid at a 
person’s time of birth. Migration between states would more likely dilute the estimated 
effects of Medicaid on mortality making this paper’s results conservative.  
This study is also limited by the length of its data. The 1965 birth cohort is only 
45 years old in 2010 and the lasting effects of Medicaid could only be observed at 
relatively low mortality ages. Prior literature suggests that the effects of early-life health 
environment become more prominent at older ages when mortality rates increase. 
Similarly, the association between Medicaid availability at birth and adult mortality may 
become stronger in later years. 
DISCUSSION 
Faster declines in infant mortality accompanied the advent of Medicaid in the late 1960s. 
These improvements associated with the federal public insurance program were 
substantial.  The results from this paper’s analysis show that the annual rate of infant 
mortality decline doubled after states’ Medicaid participation. It made an impact on the 
overall population health by targeting women and infants who had the least access to 
health care and the highest levels of infant mortality. Improving the health of the neediest 
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group raised the average survival rate of the overall population. Moreover, Medicaid may 
also have had a positive health impact on women and infants who did not directly benefit 
from the public program. It served as a conduit for health knowledge to travel from 
researchers and physicians to the general public. As more women interacted with the 
medical system and changed their health beliefs and behavior, they reinforced the health 
knowledge of other women. Medicaid enhanced concurrent public health initiatives to 
reduce infant mortality. Combined, these factors lead to the large infant mortality 
improvements observed in the United States in the period after 1965.  
The health impact of Medicaid in-utero and in infanthood was significant enough 
to yield later-life consequences. Cohorts born after their States adopted Medicaid 
experienced greater mortality decline throughout childhood and into adulthood, well past 
their eligible age. In fact, mortality improvements associated with Medicaid are greater at 
older age groups. This paper draws attention to the significance of early life access to 
health care in-utero and during infanthood in improving population health throughout the 
life-course.  
These findings suggest what the United States may expect after the rollout of the 
Affordable Care Act. Proposed Medicaid expansions will provide access to estimated 
17million adults who currently live without health care coverage. Younger adults who 
comprise a large proportion of the uninsured would be most impacted by these 
expansions.  These adults will have better access to care and have more frequent 
interactions with health care providers. In a similar manner to pregnant women and 
prenatal care, people who have greater interaction with health care providers are more 
likely to have better personal health behaviors and practices (Andersen 1995; Kiefe et al. 
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1998). Increasing access to health care through the ACA will connect more people to 
health care providers and services. These people will adopt healthier behaviors and in 
turn, will reinforce good practices and behaviors in their communities.    
Better health behaviors in earlier adulthood also have lasting consequences in 
later life health and mortality. Adapting healthy behaviors such as refraining from 
smoking, engaging in physical activity, and having sound dietary habits lead to lower 
morbidity and mortality (Daneai et al. 2009).  Just as an increase in insurance coverage 
among pregnant women had lasting mortality consequences on their children, an increase 
in insurance coverage among young, healthy adults may lead to a healthier older 
population.  
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Fig. 2.1     Infant mortality rates in the United States, 1959-1979 
 
Notes: Calculations are limited to the white population. Scatter plot represents fifty states excluding the 
District of Columbia. National Infant Mortality Rate weighted by the number of births in each state.  
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Fig. 2.2 Annual improvements in infant mortality associated with Medicaid 
implementation by State 
 
Notes: Calculations are limited to the white population. Scatter plot represents fifty states excluding the 
District of Columbia. Data point sizes represent the number of births in 1965. 
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Fig 2.3 Logged ratio of infant mortality rate surrounding Medicaid start 
 
Notes: Calculations are limited to the white population. Calculations are weighted by the number of births. 
Values are average logged ratio of states’ infant mortality rates relative to the year immediately prior to 
Medicaid implementation.  
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Table 2.1   Annual change in state infant mortality rate regressed on timing of Medicaid participation 
Number of years since Medicaid implementation in state at birth 
a
 -0.326 *** 
Birth year 
b
 -0.382 *** 
Constant 23.22   
R-Squared 0.98   
Infant mortality trends before and after Medicaid implementation estimated from coefficients 
Annual rate of IMR decline in years before Medicaid -0.382   
Annual rate of IMR decline in years after Medicaid 
c
 -0.708   
Notes: IMR units are in infant deaths per 1000 live births. Regression model includes state fixed-effects and weighted by the number of births in given year. Data 
is limited to the US white population. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedastic panels.  
a Years prior to Medicaid implementation is set to zero 
b Represented as years since 1959 
c Calculated as the sum of coefficients, a and b 
*p < 0.5, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Fig. 2.4     Expected US infant mortality rates with and without Medicaid 
 
 
Notes: Estimates are based on coefficients from Table 2.1. Data is limited to the US white Population. Values are weighted by the number of births in each state 
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Fig. 2.5     Cumulative mortality probabilities by ten-year age group and birth year 
 
Notes: Data is limited to the US white population. Mortality probabilities are cumulative probabilities of dying for each birth cohort living through each ten-year 
age period.  
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Table 2.2    Annual change in cumulative mortality probabilities regressed on timing of Medicaid participation (%)   
  Age 1-9 Age 10-19 Age 20-29 Age 30-39 
Number of years since Medicaid implementation in state at birth 
a
 -0.017 -0.006 -0.034 -0.021 
Birth year 
b
 -0.005 -0.011 -0.010 -0.023 
Constant 0.561 0.718 1.215 1.622 
R-Squared 0.87 0.87 0.85 0.70 
Mortality trends for cohorts born before and after Medicaid implementation         
Annual rate of mortality probability decline for cohorts born before Medicaid -0.005 -0.011 -0.010 -0.023 
Annual rate of mortality probability decline for cohorts born after Medicaid 
c
 -0.022 -0.017 -0.043 -0.044 
Notes: All coefficients are significant at the alpha 0.001 level. Mortality probabilities are cumulative probabilities of dying within each ten-year age group. 
Regression model includes state fixed-effects and is weighted by the number of births in given year. Data is limited to the US white population. Standard errors 
are corrected for heteroskedastic panels.  
a Years prior to Medicaid implementation is set to zero 
b Represented as years since 1959 
c Calculated as the sum of coefficients, a and b 
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Fig. 2.6     Expected cumulative mortality probabilities with and without Medicaid by age group  
 
Notes: Analysis is limited to US white population. Mortality probabilities are cumulative probabilities of dying for each birth cohort living through each ten-year 
age period. Estimates are based on coefficients presented in Table 2.2.  
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Table 2.3   Predicted population with and without Medicaid, 1970 birth cohort   
  Without Medicaid   With Medicaid 
x nqx (%) ndx lx   nqx (%) ndx lx 
0-1 2.06 63,488 3,089,212   1.89 58,371 3,089,212 
1-9 0.50 15,159 3,025,724   0.44 13,254 3,030,841 
10-19 0.60 18,022 3,010,565   0.57 17,325 3,017,586 
20-29 1.11 33,171 2,992,542   0.98 29,437 3,000,262 
30-39 1.37 40,454 2,959,371   1.29 38,226 2,970,825 
40     2,918,917       2,932,598 
Excess under 40 mortality in 1970 cohort  without Medicaid (2,918,917 - 2,932,598) 13,681 
Notes: Data is limited to the US white population. Life tables use actual number of births in 1970 as the radix. nqx is based on mortality probabilities estimated in 
Tables 2.1 and 2.2.  
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Table 2.4    Medicaid implementation dates 
Implementation Month and Year State 
January 1966 Hawaii, Illinois, Minnesota, North Dakota, 
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania 
March 1966 California 
May 1966 New York 
July 1966 Connecticut, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, 
Maryland, Nebraska, Ohio, Rhode Island, Utah, 
Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin 
September 1966 Massachusetts 
October 1966 Delaware, Michigan 
December 1966 New Mexico 
July 1967 Iowa, Kansas, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, 
Oregon, Wyoming 
September 1967 Texas 
October 1967 Georgia, Missouri, South Dakota  
July 1968 South Carolina 
January 1969 Colorado, Tennessee 
July 1969 Virginia 
January 1970 Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Indiana, Mississippi, 
New Jersey, North Carolina 
July 1972 Alaska 
October 1982 Arizona 
Source: Gruber (2003) 
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Fig. 2.7  Medicaid implementation timing 
 
Notes: States joined the Medicaid program between January 1966 and October 1982. 48 out of 50 states implemented Medicaid prior to 1971. 
Light shades indicate early adoption and dark shares indicate late adoption.  
Source: Gruber (2003) 
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Chapter 3: Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Health Insurance Coverage: 
Dynamics of gaining and losing coverage over the life-course 
 
ABSTRACT 
Health insurance coverage varies substantially between racial and ethnic groups in the 
United States. Current health care reforms attempt to reduce this gap by offering 
government subsidies and expanding Medicaid to eligible persons. By centering the 
discourse on insuring the uninsured, policymakers and scholars neglect to consider the 
dynamic nature of gaining and losing insurance. I simulate the expected number of years 
without health insurance coverage before becoming eligible for Medicare at 65 for non-
Hispanic whites, African Americans, Hispanics, and Asians. I derive age-specific rates of 
insurance gain and loss from the 2008 Panel of the Income and Program Participation 
(N= 114,345) to construct increment-decrement life tables. The expected number of years 
to live uninsured for whites is 8 years. In comparison, African Americans are expected to 
live 13 years, Hispanics 22 years, and Asians 11 years uninsured before reaching 
Medicare eligibility.   I decompose this racial and ethnic disparity in expected coverage 
and find that the disparity is largely driven by minority groups’ greater propensity to lose 
the health insurance that they already have. Increasing insurance-security to non-Hispanic 
white levels among minority groups will reduce the number of years uninsured by about 
50% for African Americans and Hispanics, and by 23% for Asians.  
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Racial and ethnic disparities in health insurance coverage rates account for a 
sizable share of the difference in access to health care (Lillie-Blanton and Hoffman 
2005). African American and Hispanic individuals in the United States are more likely to 
be uninsured at any given moment than non-Hispanic individuals (Kirby and Kaneda 
2010). Without insurance, people face considerable barriers in receiving health services. 
The uninsured have a limited source of care as many health care providers require 
insurance coverage from their patients and face prohibitively high costs when they do 
receive care (Himmelstein et al. 2005; Institute of Medicine 2002; Kasper et al. 2000; 
Nelson et al. 1999; Zuekas & Weinick 1999). Inconsistent or unstable insurance coverage 
also have negative consequences on the health care. Patients who frequently change 
health care providers due to insurance loss or change experience more interruptions in 
their care and are less likely to establish ongoing relationships with their physicians.   
Efforts to decrease health disparities between racial and ethnic groups must 
identify and reduce factors that cause African Americans, Hispanics, and Asians to have 
greater uninsurance rates relative to non-Hispanic whites. Prior literature has identified 
socioeconomic characteristics—income, employment, citizenship, and language—
associated with uninsurance that are more prevalent in minority populations. All these 
factors are presented as barriers to acquiring health insurance. Few studies acknowledge 
that high uninsurance rates can occur in populations due to the greater frequency in which 
people lose insurance. Even fewer studies, if any, account for how the changing dynamics 
of gaining and losing insurance across the life-course contributes to overall racial and 
ethnic disparities in insurance coverage rates.  
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This paper simulates insurance coverage for African Americans, Hispanics, and 
Asians from birth till age 65 and examines how the differences in rates of loss and gain at 
various ages contribute to their lower insurance coverage relative to non-Hispanic whites. 
Specifically, I address three research questions.  
1. How much of between-race/ethnic disparity is explained by differences in rates 
of insurance gain? How much of it is explained insurance loss?  
2. How do the dynamics of losing and gaining insurance contribute to the disparity 
across the life-course?  
3. What is the expected number of years to live uninsured among minorities if they 
had the same rates of insurance gain or loss of non-Hispanic whites?   
The findings shed light on how much recent health reforms will reduce coverage 
gaps between minority groups and the white population. I decompose the overall racial 
and ethnic disparity into insurance gain and insurance loss controlling for mortality rates 
to determine the impact of policies targeted towards making insurance more accessible to 
disadvantaged populations.  
Overall, about 19 percent of the non-elderly US population is uninsured 
(Clemens-Cope et al. 2012) but the prevalence of uninsurance differs substantially by 
race or ethnic group. About twenty-percent of African Americans are uninsured. In 
comparison non-Hispanic whites have an uninsurance rate of about thirteen percent (KFF 
2013). About 18 percent of Asians are not insured. Hispanics have the higher prevalence 
of uninsurance; about a third of Hispanics living in the United States are without health 
insurance. Researchers cite low income and propensity to work in jobs with no health 
insurance benefits as the primary cause for high uninsurance rates among African 
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Americans (Institute of Medicine 2003). Studies say their low-income jobs pay too much 
to qualify for public assistance but pay too little to be able to afford private insurance 
policies leaving individuals and families to live without coverage (Edin and Kefalas 
2011). Lack of job-based insurance is also a reason why Hispanics have high uninsurance 
rates. In addition, language barriers and immigration rules that prevent undocumented 
and recent immigrants from enrolling in public plans prevent Hispanics from being 
getting insurance (DeNavas-Walt et al. 2013; Goldman, Smith, and Sood 2005).  Low 
take-up of public insurance has been cited along with employment in jobs without health 
benefits as the cause of high uninsurance rates among Asians (Institute of Medicine 
2003). The Affordable Care Act (ACA) and other health policy measures are taking step 
to address these issues. The ACA is offering government subsidies to help lower-income 
working families without employer benefits afford private insurance plans. Medicaid 
aims to expand eligibility beyond children and the medically needy to reduce uninsurance 
rates among low-income, healthy adults. Outreach in multiple languages aims to lower 
linguistic barriers to enrolling in both public and private insurance among Hispanics and 
Asians.  
The focus is clearly on insuring the uninsured. Cross-sectional evaluations of the 
policy’s impact, while informative, overlook the beneficiaries’ potentially greater risk of 
losing their new insurance coverage. Studies expect the ACA to increase enrollment 
among racial and ethnic minorities (Clemans-Cope et al. 2012; Holahan and McGrath 
2013 ) but this paper shows increasing enrollment does not necessarily translate into 
proportionately higher insurance coverage rates.  
  
 
 
95 
 
THEORY AND LITERATURE 
Racial and ethnic disparities in insurance coverage rates result from differences in their 
tendencies to lose or gain health insurance. In this section, I first briefly discuss the 
necessity of examining health insurance status as a dynamic process. Second, I review the 
literature on how the rates of gain or loss contribute to racial and ethnic disparities in 
coverage rates. Third, I discuss the importance of comparing age-specific patterns of 
insurance transitions to understand and to reduce coverage disparities.  
Dynamic Nature of Insurance Coverage 
I examine insurance coverage rates as a function of the population’s rates of 
insurance gain and loss. This methodology of examining the uninsured stems from 
research on the persistence of spells of poverty and unemployment (Bane and Ellewood 
1985; Corcoran et al. 1985). Similarly to poverty and unemployment, a person’s 
insurance status or a change in status is not permanent. Point-in-time estimates of the 
uninsured are also over-represented by the proportion that has been uninsured for a long 
time and masks the heterogeneity of the group (Swartz and McBride 1990; Swartz, 
Marcotte, and McBride 1993; Monheit and Schur 1988). Examining insurance status as a 
dynamic process can capture how frequently groups lose insurance and how long it takes 
to gain insurance coverage again. This approach allows us to differentiate people who are 
uninsured because they are more likely to lose insurance from people who are uninsured 
because they are less likely to find insurance.  
When researchers began to examine poverty as a dynamic process, scholarly 
understanding of who experience poverty changed. The perception of the “underclass” 
popularized by poverty debates in the 1960s (Harrington 1962; Willis 1977) gave way to 
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new research in the 1970s and 1980s that showed the dynamic and heterogeneous nature 
of falling into and out of poverty. People from various socioeconomic backgrounds 
experienced poverty often coinciding with life events such as the birth of a child, starting 
a new household, job loss, and divorce (Edwards 2014; Corcoran 1995).  
Researchers have been applying these methods on longitudinal data to examine 
the dynamics of health insurance coverage (Swartz and McBride 1990; Fairlie and 
London 2009). The vast majority of people live without insurance in short spells; only a 
small fraction of uninsured had been living without insurance for more than two years 
(Swartz and McBride 1990; Congressional Budget Office 2003). The literature on 
uninsurance is beginning to evolve from cross-sectional examinations of the uninsured to 
studying the dynamics of insurance.  
Young adults, individuals with less education, the unemployed, and the unmarried 
have higher rates of losing health insurance. Trigger events such as losing employment, 
changing jobs, losing a spouse are also connected to insurance loss (Lavelle and Smock 
2012; Peters, Simon, and Taber 2014).  Once an individual loses health insurance the 
person’s demographic and socioeconomic characteristics also determine how quickly 
they will regain coverage. Individuals with higher income, full-time employment, and 
greater educational attainment have higher rates of gaining insurance which result in 
shorter spells without insurance (Swartz, Marcotte, and McBride 1993).  
Health insurance policies in the United States attempt to provide a safety net for 
individuals who are experiencing life events that may trigger insurance loss. COBRA 
allows individuals to temporarily maintain coverage from a private insurance plan after 
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divorce or job loss. The Affordable Care Act aims to make health insurance more 
accessible through exchanges and expanding Medicare eligibility.  
Racial and Ethnic Disparity in Uninsurance 
The African American and Hispanic population has a greater prevalence of trigger events 
and socioeconomic characteristics that are associated with greater insurance loss and 
slower insurance gain. Access to private health insurance coverage is tied to employment 
and marriage in the United States. Minority groups are disadvantaged in both areas. Rates 
of unemployment are higher among African American men and women than their non-
Hispanic white counterparts and job loss is more prevalent in among minority groups 
(Bureau of Labor Statistics 2014). African American and Hispanic individuals are less 
likely to marry than non-Hispanic whites. Among those who did marry, their first 
marriages are more likely to end in divorce and the proportion remarrying is lower than 
non-Hispanic white men and women (Aughinbaugh , Robles, and Sun 2013; Bulanda and 
Brown 2007).  
Insurance policies that aim to provide safety nets during events associated with 
insurance loss (COBRA) and needs-based public insurance options that makes insurance 
more accessible (Medicaid) do not completely mitigate the insurance consequences of 
socioeconomic differences.  
Furthermore, Fairlie and London (2009) find that insurance coverage disparities 
cannot be completely explained by compositional differences in educational attainment, 
income, and employment. Prior studies show that racial or ethnic background did not 
exert a significant impact on the rate of exiting an uninsurance spell (Swartz, Marcotte, 
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and McBride 1993). Rather, African Americans and Hispanics’ had greater rates of 
insurance loss than non-Hispanic whites (Fairlie and London 2008). 
Age-Dependent Nature of Insurance Coverage 
Health insurance coverage varies distinctly by age. Empirically, the insurance coverage 
rate is below 10 percent for children under 18. The rate of uninsurance increases to 
around 20 percent between 18 and 24 and reaches its peak in early adulthood between 25 
and 35. The uninsurance rate decreases in later adulthood but does not reach under-18 
levels until age 65 when the vast majority of US residents become eligible for Medicare 
(Cohen and Martinez 2014).  
Age-dependent demographic, economic, and policy factors lead to this age-
pattern of insurance coverage. Children under 18 can be eligible for needs-based 
insurance coverage through state-sponsored programs such as Medicaid and Children’s 
Health Insurance Program (CHIP). Due to state-level eligibility rules, younger children 
are more likely to have access to state-sponsored health insurance coverage than older 
children. Children age out of public health insurance plans after turning 19 and can no 
longer be enrolled in their parents’ private health plans after turning 26. Eligible pregnant 
women and mothers of young children (generally affects people aged between 15 and 45) 
can enroll in Medicaid. Getting married and having children is also associated with great 
insurance gain among the general population (Fairlie and London 2008). Full-time 
employees are more likely to gain and maintain health insurance coverage (Fairlie and 
London 2008) and the proportion of the population with full-time employment steady 
increases throughout adulthood till retirement at 65 (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2015). 
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From these age-dependent factors, I expect the rates of insurance gain to be highest 
among children under 18 and the rates of insurance loss to peak in early adulthood.  
DATA 
I use the 2008 Panel of the Survey of Income Program Participation (SIPP) to derive the 
age-specific rates of losing and gaining health insurance that served as the basis of my 
life-table calculations. The SIPP is a nationally representative series of longitudinal 
panels whose survey duration ranges from 2.5 to 4 years. The first SIPP panel was 
sampled in the early 1980s and a new panel was re-sampled from the non-
institutionalized population in the U.S. every one to four years. The SIPP revisits 
respondent every four months and collects information on their insurance status for the 
preceding four months. Each four-month period is known as a wave. SIPP’s 2008 panel 
collected 14 waves for available respondents (non-institutionalized, US residents) 
covering information across 56 months throughout 2008 to 2012.  
Heaping is a known problem in the SIPP and respondents are biased towards 
reporting changes to their insurance status at the beginning of each wave rather than at 
the actual month that the change occurred. While monthly insurance status is available in 
the SIPP, I have chosen to consider only the first reference month of each wave to 
evaluate respondents’ insurance statuses and record changes. This method makes the 
assumption that changes in insurance status can only happen up to once in a four-month 
period. All calculations are weighted by SIPP’s person-level weights that account for 
sampling and attrition.  
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ANALYTIC STRATEGY 
I utilize insurance data from the 2008 SIPP to calculate the rates of gaining and losing 
insurance as well as rates of mortality. I derive these transition rates separately for each 
race or ethnic group to compare their overall rates of insurance loss and gain. Rates of 
insurance gain or loss depend on age.  Thus, I calculate age-specific rates of insurance 
transitions by race and create two-state increment-decrement life tables for each group to 
describe the dynamics of living with and without insurance. I then compare the 
differences in the proportion uninsured between race/ethnic groups by age.  Lastly, I 
decompose this difference across the life course to determine how much of the racial and 
ethnic disparity can be explained by the differences in the rates of insurance gain or loss. 
All analyses are limited to persons under 65 years of age. I describe this process in more 
detail.  
Calculating Transition Rates 
To address the first research question, I calculate the rates of losing and gaining insurance 
for each racial or ethnic group. The pattern of gaining and losing insurance resembles a 
Poisson distribution (Swartz and McBride 1990). Using this property, I derive the 
probability of losing or gaining insurance within a year of being insured or uninsured. I 
took all persons whose insurance statuses were recorded in two consecutive waves and 
calculated the proportion of insured in the former wave that was uninsured in the latter 
wave. I repeat a similar calculation to derive the proportion of uninsured who gained 
insurance in the later wave. From these proportions, I converted them into annual rates 
using the assumption that these transitions occur in a Poisson process with a constant 
rate.  
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, 
where i is the initial insurance status and j is the insurance status after 4 months for group 
r. d denotes the number of people who transitioned from state i to j and p denotes the 
number of persons in insurance state i at the beginning of the four-month period.  
Using these rates I convert them into annual transition probabilities for each 
group.  
, 
where i is the initial insurance status and j is the insurance status after 4 months group r. 
These numbers represent the probability of losing or gaining insurance within one 
year of being insured or uninsured. We can compare these rates between groups and 
examine how fast one group loses or gains health insurance relative to another.  
Creating Multi-state Increment-Decrement Models 
These models describe how each racial and ethnic group transition between being insured 
and uninsured throughout the life course taking into account differential rates of gaining 
and losing insurance by age. They also include differential mortality by age and insurance 
status.  
First I derive the age-specific insurance transition and mortality probabilities by 
group from the 2008 SIPP. I took all persons whose insurance or death status were 
recorded in two consecutive waves and calculated the proportion who transitioned into 
another state since the prior wave. I calculated these proportions separately by age at the 
beginning of the prior wave. I derived the proportion that lost/gained insurance among 
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those who had/did not have insurance at the beginning of the prior wave. In a similar 
fashion, I calculate the proportion that gained insurance and the proportion that died from 
each insurance state. Again using the properties of the Poisson distribution, I convert 
these 4-month transitions probabilities into annual rates.  
, 
where i is the originating state (insured or uninsured) at age x  and j is the transition state 
(insured, uninsured, or dead) after 4 months, for group r. Using these rates, I calculate 
transition probabilities for each age.  
, 
where i is the originating state (insured or uninsured) at age x  and j is the transition state 
(insured, uninsured, or dead) at age x+1, for group r. 
These transition probabilities serves as the basis for the multi-state increment-
decrement life table that I created employing the methodology described in Schoen 
(1975). This framework accounts for age-specific different transition forces between 
states to estimate the number of person insured and uninsured across the life-course.  
Comparing Standardized Life-Tables between Groups 
By comparing the proportion uninsured at each age, we can determine the disparity in 
insurance rates between racial and ethnic groups by age. Because these life tables are 
solely derived from five factors—initial proportion without insurance at birth, age-
specific rates of losing insurance, age-specific rates of gaining insurance, age-specific 
rates of mortality for uninsured, and age-specific mortality for insured—we can compare 
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the effects of the difference in one of the factors while standardizing the remaining four. 
Taking the difference between equivalently standardized life-tables from two racial or 
ethnic groups will display the age-specific disparity attributable to one of the five factors. 
In this analysis, I specifically I examine the life-course disparity in uninsurance 
prevalence due to difference in age-specific rates of gaining insurance and difference in 
age-specific rates of losing insurance. I standardize all other factors using the 
methodology described in Gupta (1993).  
Decomposing the Disparity across the Life Course 
The last component of this analysis calculates the proportion of the overall racial and 
ethnic disparity that is caused by each of the five factors. I adapt the decomposition 
methodology described in Gupta (1993) and apply the standardized life-tables created in 
the previous section onto a common population distribution (US 2009 population). I then 
derive the difference in the proportion uninsured attributable to each of the five factors. 
These differences sum to the overall between-group difference. In addition, I examine the 
disparity in terms of expected number of years lived without insurance between birth and 
age 64. In a similar manner, I decompose the difference to determine how many more 
years each factor contributes to a group living without insurance relative to non-Hispanic 
whites.  
RESULTS 
I present the results in answer to this paper’s three research questions.  
How much of between-race/ethnic disparity is explained by difference rates of insurance 
gain? How much of it is explained insurance loss? 
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Non-Hispanic whites have the smallest proportion (.12) living without health insurance 
among African Americans, Hispanics, and Asians. In concordance with prior research, 
the rate of uninsurance is very high among the Hispanic population (.35). A third of non-
elderly Hispanic persons live without health insurance coverage. Table 3.1 presents these 
results. The disparity in the expected number of years to live without insurance under 
current conditions is also quite large. Whites are expected to live on average a little less 
than eight years without insurance before reaching 65. In comparison, African Americans 
are expected to live almost 13 years and Asian Americans, 10 years without health 
insurance. Hispanics are expected to live over 22 years without health insurance coverage 
before reaching 65.  
The last two lines of Table 3.1 compare the dynamics of losing and gaining 
insurance between the groups. The disparity in the rates of losing insurance is large. Non-
Hispanic whites have a probability of .12 of losing health insurance within one year.  
African Americans are twice as likely to lose insurance with a probability of .24. 
Hispanics have a greater probability still at .31. The probability of losing insurance is not 
as high for Asians at .15. In contrast, the disparity in the rates of gaining insurance 
between groups is not as high. In fact, African Americans are more likely to get insured 
within one year of losing insurance (.65) than non-Hispanic whites (.59). Hispanics are 
about 13 percent less likely than whites to gain insurance after one year of living without 
coverage.   
A decomposition analysis of the race or ethnic difference in insurance coverage 
confirms that differences in the rates of loss accounts for much of the disparity. Table 3.2 
shows how much of the overall disparity is caused by each of the five factors. Negative 
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numbers indicate that the minority group has an advantage over non-Hispanic whites for 
the corresponding factor. All groups are compared to the non-Hispanic white population.  
African Americans’ advantageous rates of insurance gain relative to non-Hispanic 
whites are completely offset by their very high rates of loss. Their higher rates of 
insurance gain alone would yield a lower prevalence of uninsurance relative to whites but 
their significantly greater rates of loss, slightly higher rates of infants born without 
insurance, and mortality patterns results in a difference of .08. That is, after accounting 
for differences in population distribution, eight percent more African Americans live 
without health insurance than whites. Seventy-eight percent of the Hispanic-white 
disparity in insurance coverage is explained by their greater rates of coverage loss. 
Twenty-two percent of the disparity is caused by their lower rates in obtaining health 
insurance. The rates of insurance gain among Hispanics are the lowest relative to whites. 
Together, they contribute to a greater proportion of Hispanics being uninsured (22% 
more) than whites. Almost all of the Asian-white disparity—a difference of 4 percent—is 
caused by Asians’ greater probability of losing insurance (98%).  
 
How do the dynamics of losing and gaining insurance contribute to the disparity across 
the life-course? 
Figure 3.1 shows the proportion uninsured by race/ethnic group from birth to age 64. 
Children under 18 have lower rates of uninsurance relative to adults within their 
race/ethnic group. This reflects the availability of state-sponsored insurance options for 
lower-income children. The age-specific patterns and levels of insurance coverage differ 
substantially by group. The prevalence of uninsurance is the highest among Hispanics at 
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all ages. The difference is particularly high after the age of 30. African American and 
Asian children have similar coverage to non-Hispanic whites during childhood but they 
diverge in young adulthood. The 20s is a period of high uninsurance for all groups but it 
is particularly higher for minorities. African Americans’ coverage increases in later 
adulthood but remains lower than whites until everyone qualifies for Medicare at age 65. 
Asians’ coverage exceeds that of whites in their early 30s but steadily falls till 65. Much 
of the coverage disparity between Asians and non-Hispanic whites originate from greater 
uninsurance among middle-aged Asians.  
Figure 3.2’s age-specific rates of insurance loss loosely mirrors the age-patterns 
of insurance coverages rates. Insurance loss spikes in the early 20s for all groups but 
Hispanics have the greatest loss rate at almost all ages. Insurance coverage is notably 
precarious for African American infants and young adults; their rates of loss are similar 
to that of Hispanics’ during these age groups. Asians have relatively higher rates of loss 
during young adulthood and after age 40 reflecting their age-patterns of uninsurance 
prevalence. Surprisingly, age-specific rates of insurance gain (Figure 3.2) are the highest 
among African Americans. This gain-advantage over whites is particularly prominent 
during childhood. Except for a brief period in early adulthood, African Americans have 
advantageous insurance gain rates relative to whites throughout adulthood. The converse 
is true for Hispanics. Their rates of insurance gain are lower than their white counterparts 
at all ages. Asians’ rates of insurance gain are equivalent to that of whites after early 
childhood.  
How do these disparate age-specific rates of insurance gain and losses contribute 
to the age patterns of uninsurance? Figures 3.3 to 3.5 examines the age-specific disparity 
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in uninsurance rates of the three minority groups relative to the non-Hispanic population. 
In each of these graphs, I show three lines. The solid line is the actual difference in the 
proportion uninsured. Values above 0 indicate greater proportion of the minority group 
without insurance. The dashed line is the simulated difference in proportion due to 
differences in age-specific rates of insurance loss standardized for all other factors. This 
can be interpreted as the disparity in uninsurance prevalence had only the rates of loss 
been different. The dotted line is the simulated difference in proportion due to differences 
in age-specific rates of insurance gain.  
The prevalence of uninsurance among African American is higher than whites 
throughout all ages. They are also more likely than whites to gain insurance at all ages 
with the exception of a brief period in their early 20s. The dotted line in Figure 3.3 shows 
that African Americans’ gain-advantage would yield lower rates of uninsurance than 
whites. However, the high rates of insurance loss among African Americans more than 
offset this gain-advantage. The dashed line in Figure 3.3 shows that African Americans 
would have had an even higher uninsurance rate without their advantageous rates of 
insurance gain.  
The coverage disparity between Hispanics and whites are explained both by 
Hispanics’ lower rates of insurance gain and higher rates of insurance loss (Figure 3.4). 
Differences in rates of loss account for most of the coverage disparity in childhood but, 
Hispanics’ increasing difficulty in gaining insurance becomes a greater contributor to 
coverage disparity in adulthood.  
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Asians’ rates of insurance loss account for almost all their lower coverage rates relative to 
whites. Figure 3.5 shows that the simulated coverage disparity due to difference in 
insurance loss closely follows the age-patterns of actual coverage disparity.  
 
What is the expected number of years to live uninsured among minorities if they had the 
same rates of insurance gain or loss of non-Hispanic whites? 
Table 3.3 represents the findings in terms of number of years without insurance. These 
numbers indicate the number of years a person would expect to live without coverage 
before age 65 if he or she is exposed to the age-specific rates of insurance gain, insurance 
loss, and mortality observed from cross-sectional data. African Americans are expected 
to spend almost 5 more years without insurance throughout the life-course than non-
Hispanic whites. If they had the same rates of insurance loss as whites, African 
Americans would spend 6.2 less years uninsured. From our previous graphs we saw that 
the rates of insurance gain among African Americans were higher than non-Hispanic 
whites. If the gain rates of African Americans’ were lowered to that of whites, the 
African Americans would spend 1.3 more years without coverage. Ensuring that insured 
Hispanics do not lose their coverage more than whites would reduce the expected number 
of years without insurance by half from 22 years to 11 years. Increasing the rates of 
insurance gain for uninsured Hispanics to white-levels would only decrease the expected 
number of years spent without insurance to about 19 years. Asians are expected to live 
about 2.5 years longer without insurance than whites. A small portion of that difference is 
also due to lower under-65 mortality rates among Asians relative to whites (Table 3.3). If 
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Asians were to have the same level of insurance security as whites, their expected years 
without insurance would decrease to 8 years.  
DISCUSSION 
The results demonstrate that racial and ethnic disparities in overall health insurance 
coverage are predominantly driven by differences in rates of insurance loss. Across the 
life course, non-Hispanic whites are least likely to lose health insurance and thus, have 
the greatest coverage. Early adulthood appears to be a time when minority groups are 
doubly disadvantaged. They are more likely to lose insurance and take longer to find new 
coverage than non-Hispanic whites. Differences in employment and marital status may 
account for this effect. Young white adults are more likely to have an employer who 
offers health insurance and to be married. During early adulthood, not only are the rates 
of uninsurance the highest, but racial and ethnic inequalities are also the greatest.  
The analyses in this paper do not distinguish the different forms of insurance: 
employment-based private, marriage-based private, Medicaid, or Medicare.  
Employment-based private insurance plans may be more stable than Medicaid. 
Economic, demographic, and social inequalities between racial/ethnic groups determine 
the types of health insurance that groups enroll in. The type of health insurance is a large 
determinant in the likelihood of losing coverage. The analyses of this paper calculate the 
inequalities in insurance gains and losses that result from these factors.  
The SIPP does not include persons who are incarcerated. Almost ten percent of 
African American adult men under 40 were incarcerated at any given day in 2010 (Neal 
and Rick 2014). In comparison, less than three percent of non-Hispanic white men were 
incarcerated. The disproportionately high incarceration rate among African American 
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men may bias the results drawn from the SIPP. If these men were not incarcerated, the 
insurance coverage disparity would increase as the uninsurance rate would likely be high 
among those at risk for incarceration. More African American men without stable health 
insurance coverage would be included in the analysis pool increasing the already large 
coverage gap in early adulthood. The current results would be understating the racial 
inequality.  
It is very likely that high rates of insurance gain and loss will have negative 
consequences on a person’s health care. After insurance loss, patients may need to stop 
ongoing care. And when they re-gain insurance coverage, they may need to seek new 
health care providers that accept the new plan. The frequent changes in sources of care 
prevent patients from developing an ongoing, established relationship with health care 
providers. Physicians have less knowledge of the medical history of new patients than 
established patients. Levels of trust between physicians and patients may also be low. 
These factors could contribute patients with unstable health insurance coverage to receive 
poorer care compared to their continuously insured counterparts even when insured. 
Unstable health insurance coverage may contribute to the empirically observed lower 
levels of physician trust among patients of minority racial and ethnic backgrounds 
(Blendon et al. 1995; Gamble 1993; Peterson 2002; Stepanikova et al. 2006). 
Patients who have unstable insurance may make their medical decisions with the 
expectation of losing insurance coverage. They may have a preference for shorter-term 
solutions or treatments plans that requires less follow-up. Greater expectation of 
insurance loss by either the patient or the physician may contribute to biases in referrals 
to specialists and in receiving surgical procedures (Einbinder and Schulman 2000).  
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While establishing a direct connection between insurance instability and health 
care delivery is beyond the scope of this paper, the results draw attention to a potentially 
large and significant mechanism through which health inequality persists between racial 
and ethnic groups in the United States. Social and economic factors create unstable and 
precarious insurance coverage among minority groups compared to non-Hispanic whites. 
This greater insurance instability may translate into disparities in health care delivery and 
inequalities in health outcomes.  
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Table 3.1. Differences in prevalence and dynamics of uninsurance between groups  
  
Non-Hispanic 
White 
African 
American  
Hispanic Asian 
Proportion without Insurance 0.12 0.20 0.35 0.16 
Expected Years without Insurance 7.97 12.81 22.25 10.41 
Probability of losing insurance within one year of being insured 0.12 0.24 0.31 0.15 
Probability of gaining insurance within one year of being uninsured 0.59 0.65 0.51 0.58 
Notes         
Proportions without insurance and expected years without insurance derived from persons under 65. 
Values represent uninsurance prevalence of a hypothetical cohort exposed to the age-specific rates of insurance gain, loss, and 
mortality observed from cross sectional data. 
Data Source: 2008 SIPP         
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Table 3.2. Decomposition of disparity in proportion without health insurance prior to age 65 
  
African American 
v. non-Hispanic 
white (%) 
Hispanic v. non-
Hispanic white (%) 
Asian v. non-
Hispanic white (%) 
Disparity due to insurance coverage at birth 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.16 0.00 -0.14 
Disparity due to greater rate of insurance loss 0.10 125.81 0.17 77.67 0.04 97.91 
Disparity due to lower rates of insurance gain -0.02 -26.29 0.05 22.05 0.00 2.10 
Disparity due to mortality among insured 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.04 0.00 -0.14 
Disparity due to mortality among uninsured 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.26 
Overall Difference 0.08 100 0.22 100 0.04 100 
Values are standardized using the US population distribution in 2009 (Source: CDC/NCHS, National Vital Statistics System.) 
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Fig. 3.1. Age-specific patters of insurance coverage by race and ethnicity 
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Fig. 3.2. Age-specific patterns of insurance gain, insurance loss, and mortality by race 
and insurance coverage 
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Fig. 3.3. Difference in proportion without health insurance between African Americans 
and non-Hispanic whites 
 
Notes 
Values greater than 0 indicate greater proportion of African Americans without insurance 
relative to the non-Hispanic White population. Difference from loss/ gains rates are 
derived by taking the difference in simulated proportion uninsured controlling for 
differences due to gain/loss, population distribution, mortality, and initial proportions. 
Population distribution standardized to the 2009 US population. 
Data Source: 2008 Survey of Income Program Participation 
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Fig. 3.4. Differences in proportion without health insurance between Hispanics and 
whites 
 
Notes 
Values greater than 0 indicate greater proportion of Hispanics without insurance relative 
to the non-Hispanic White population. Difference from loss/ gains rates are derived by 
taking the difference in simulated proportion uninsured controlling for differences due to 
gain/loss, population distribution, mortality, and initial proportions. Population 
distribution standardized to the 2009 US population. 
Data Source: 2008 Survey of Income Program Participation 
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Fig. 3.5. Differences in proportion without health insurance between Asians and whites 
 
Notes 
Values greater than 0 indicate greater proportion of Asians without insurance relative to 
the non-Hispanic White population. Difference from loss/ gains rates are derived by 
taking the difference in simulated proportion uninsured controlling for differences due to 
gain/loss, population distribution, mortality, and initial proportions. Population 
distribution standardized to the 2009 US population.  
Data Source: 2008 Survey of Income Program Participation 
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Table 3.3. Actual and simulated expected number of years to live without insurance from birth to age 65 
      
African 
American  
(%) Hispanic (%) Asian (%) 
a Actual expected years to live uninsured 12.81   22.25   10.41   
  Excess uninsured years relative to non-Hispanic whites (a - 7.97 years) 4.84   14.29   2.45   
b   Years saved from reducing insurance loss to non-Hispanic white levels 6.19 48.3 11.04 49.6 2.36 22.7 
  Simulated expected years uninsured with white insurance loss rates (a - b) 6.62 51.7 11.21 50.4 8.05 77.3 
c   Years saved from increasing insurance gain to non-Hispanic white levels -1.29 -10.1 3.12 14.0 0.06 0.5 
  Simulated expected years uninsured with white insurance gain rates (a - c) 14.10 110.1 19.13 86.0 10.36 99.5 
Notes 
      Values represent expected years without insurance for a hypothetical cohort exposed to the age-specific patterns of insurance 
gain, loss, and mortality observed from cross-sectional data. Expected number of years without insurance for non-Hispanic 
whites is 7.97 years. Negative values indicate that expected years uninsured will increase. Values are standardized using the 
US population distribution in 2009 (Source: CDC/NCHS, National Vital Statistics System.) 
 Data Source: SIPP 2008 
       
